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Abstract 
 
From the beginning, the Irish Republican Movement (IRM) had upheld a commitment to 
abstaining from taking elected seats in what were viewed as illegitimate government institutions. 
This commitment, coupled with the use of armed conflict to achieve their stated goals, can be 
viewed as founding pillars to their strategy for ousting the British from Ireland. In 1986, the 
abstention policy was abandoned amidst a decades-long war with the British known as the 
Troubles. This thesis explores the following questions: why did the IRM end abstention during 
the Troubles and what role did this period of time have in that decision? It is concluded that this 
decision was the means to realign the IRM’s biographical narrative with the movement’s 
practices and therefore maintain its ontological security, or stable sense of self. A number of 
critical events during the Troubles brought this tension between identity and practice into stark 
contrast. It is argued this tension was alleviated by the ending of the abstention policy and 
participation in established political processes.  
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1 
Introduction   
 With deep roots that evolved through many years of Irish history, the Irish Republican 
Movement (IRM)
1
,
2
 is based on a revolutionary ideology that believes in the use of physical 
force to gain Irish independence from the British and form a thirty-two country republic
3
. The 
unending quest for sovereignty has coloured much of Ireland’s past, from the 1916 Easter 
Uprising to the Troubles
4
 that permeated Northern Ireland from 1968 until the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998. This extensive history has produced deep-seated traditions and a rigid 
dogmatism that has been useful for ensuring the continuity of the IRM but has also created 
structures and obstacles to change which were necessary to address pressing issues. The inability 
to accept political participation as a means for supporting the IRM’s struggle in the early years of 
the Troubles, for example, damaged the morale of IRM members at a time when the support of 
those who sympathized with (and were willing to participate in), the cause was direly needed.  
 One of the most important aspects of the IRM, in terms of guiding and motivating 
members, was abstention: the practice of not taking elected seats in what were considered 
                                                          
1
 Republicanism is distinguished from nationalism by adherent’s commitment to physical force. Nationalists believe 
that Ireland should merge into one country through peaceful means, while republicans support the armed struggle 
in achieving their ends.  
2
 For the purpose of this thesis, the IRM refers to the legacy of the 1916 Easter Uprising in terms of the rise of the 
IRA and Sinn Fein as the embodiment of the IRM as well as the principles that guide that mutually constituted 
relationship. In the aftermath of the Rising, the relationship between Sinn Fein (a political movement), and the IRA 
(an Irish paramilitary) developed and this relationship shapes much of the history discussed in this thesis. There 
have been numerous splits within and between the IRA and Sinn Fein since that time which occurred over the 
contestation of the founding principles established during and in the aftermath of the Rising (i.e. the use of armed 
struggle and abstention to force Britain from Ireland and establish an independent Republic). This thesis traces and 
discusses only the history of the IRM members and leaders that remained tied to the principles established during 
the 1916 Rising. 
3
 As this thesis explains later, after the implementation of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, independence from the 
British was only in reference to Northern Ireland. 
4
 The Troubles were a 30 year violent conflict in which the IRM had dedicated themselves to ending British rule in 
Northern Ireland and uniting Northern Ireland with the independent Republic of Ireland. The conflict was 
characterized by a history of political as well as sectarian and ethnic cleavages between Catholics/Protestants and 
Irish nationalists/British loyalists. The history of these divides will be further discussed in Chapter One and the 
causes and nature of the Troubles will be addressed in Chapter’s Two and Four.  
 
 
2 
‘foreign’ and illegitimate parliaments. Abstention became a fundamental aspect of the IRM after 
the 1916 Easter Rising. In the eyes of the IRM, the Proclamation read by the leaders of the 
Rising established the “Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State”5 (Coogan 54). What 
was gained through the War of Independence that followed this declaration fell far short of the 
Republic envisioned by the leaders of 1916. Ireland was partitioned and Northern Ireland 
remained tied to Britain while the Southern parliament took a series of steps toward sovereignty 
and officially gained independence in 1949. In a demonstration of their allegiance to the 
Republic of 1916, the IRM refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of any government institution 
created by the British and committed themselves to abstaining from participation in the Leinster 
House (Dublin), Stormont (Northern Ireland) and Westminister (United Kingdom) parliaments 
(Feeney 125-6). Thus in Ireland, abstention became a core principle of the IRM’s ideology. 
However, in a landmark decision in 1986, the IRM ended the abstention policy and voted in 
favour of entering Leinster House in Dublin
6
. What is more, this fundamental policy was 
abandoned in the midst of the Troubles—one of the most important periods in the history of the 
IRM and the struggle to oust the British in Northern Ireland. This thesis is therefore guided by 
the following questions: why did the IRM decide to end abstention at this time? What role did 
                                                          
5
In this paper, the Republic refers to the Republic that was proclaimed by the leaders of the 1916 Easter Uprising 
and encompassed all of Ireland. For the IRM, the Republic was inaugurated with the 1918 Westminster election, 
when Sinn Fein candidates abstained from taking the seats they had won and instead formed the Dail. The 
Republic was never recognized as a sovereign state, but the IRM read their electoral victory as a vote of support 
for their cause. All modern IRM members and leaders claim allegiance to the Republic. This is why the IRA and Sinn 
Fein consider themselves an all-Ireland movement regardless of partition and the eventual establishment of the 
Republic of Ireland (an independent state formed among the 26 counties in 1949 that evolved from the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty).  
6
 In practice, the IRM was an all-Ireland movement, though it gradually became a predominantly Northern 
movement throughout the Troubles. For them, the fact that southern Ireland eventually became the independent 
Republic of Ireland did not make either the governing institution (Leinster House) or the partition of Ireland any 
more legitimate. They were committed to the Republic of 1916, which was an all-Ireland Republic. Therefore, they 
continued to operate as an all-Ireland movement wherein abstaining from seats in Stormont in Northern Ireland, 
Leinster House in Dublin and Westminster in Britain were all of equal importance. In 1986, they only ended the 
abstention policy in regard to Leinster House.  
 
 
3 
the Troubles play in that decision? In order to explore these questions, it is important to set 
abstention in its historical context. This will clarify both how central abstention was to the IRM, 
as well as how and why the policy was abandoned in 1986.   
 The centrality of abstention to the IRM is evidenced through the various splits in the 
movement’s history that occurred over whether to take up their elected members’ seats. The IRM 
was divided over the issue of ending abstention in 1921, 1926 and 1969. On one side were the 
ideologues who stood for the Republic as proclaimed in 1916. This group emphasized 
maintaining continuity with the traditions of the IRM, especially the commitment to the armed 
struggle and the eschewing of political activity in terms of abstaining from participation in 
formal political institutions such as elections. On the other side were those members who were 
willing to question the rigid dogmatism of abstention; members who believed that formally 
participating in politics could achieve more for the IRM than the application or threat of physical 
force. Through the numerous splits in the IRM, those who advocated for participating in politics 
were unable to maintain their claims of representing the ‘true’ IRM. Their actions created 
dissonance in regards to the symbols, myths and narratives of the IRM. It was not until 1986 that 
the IRM ended abstention in Leinster House in Dublin and were able to stake a claim on these 
symbols, myths and narratives which are central to the IRM.   
 In September 1985 the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the military element 
of the IRM, removed the constitutional ban on discussing or advocating the taking of seats. 
Following this announcement, at the 1986 ard fheis
7
 the Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), the 
political wing of the IRM, passed a resolution to end the policy of abstention. Given the 
centrality of abstention to the IRM, the decision to take up seats in 1986 is a fascinating one. Not 
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 The annual Sinn Fein party conference. 
 
 
4 
only did the IRM manage to pass the proposal to end abstention in the seventeenth year of an 
armed campaign against the British, but for the first time in its history, the motion was passed 
without causing a major split in its ranks (Feeney 330-33). In this context, two questions arise: 
why did the IRM abandon what was seen as a central tenet of the movement; and, how were they 
able to achieve such a drastic change of their manifesto? Considering that abstention had caused 
such difficulties for the IRM on a number of occasions in the past, this shift signifies an 
important institutional change. 
 This thesis takes up the questions of why and how the IRM ended the abstention policy 
and decided to take up seats in the Dublin parliament. The timing of this change is instrumental 
as it provides insight into how and why abstention was abandoned. The decision to end 
abstention took place in the midst of the Troubles. The Troubles had an irrevocable effect on the 
political and social landscape in which the IRM operated. Those members who were fiercely 
committed to the armed struggle were also suspicious of participating in politics; it was not until 
1986 that their anxieties were sufficiently calmed by the IRM leadership. The political strategy 
that was able to emerge as a result of this development was still focused on the sovereignty issue, 
but it also provided a legitimate platform through which the IRM’s goals could be expressed and 
engaged in dialogue. The IRM’s decision to formally participate in politics was a necessary 
precursor to the peace negotiations that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The 
Good Friday Agreement was the first major political development in the Northern Ireland peace 
process in the 1990s and its success depended heavily on participation in existing political 
institutions and subduing traditional inclinations toward armed conflict. This thesis argues that 
the acceptance of politics as legitimate aspect of the IRM’s identity was aided by the context in 
which it took place (i.e. during the Troubles). Therefore, as this thesis concludes, understanding 
 
 
5 
the context in which the decision to end abstention took place generates insight applicable to 
conflict resolution.   
 
Methodology 
 This thesis will employ a case study methodology, focusing on the decision by the IRM 
to formally participate in politics. In contrast to quantitative research, which examines a few 
variables across a large number of cases, the case study approach offers a qualitative 
investigation of the complex interaction of many factors in a few cases (Thomas 512). According 
to Gary Thomas, case studies are 
an analysis of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, 
institutions or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more 
methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of 
a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame—an object—
within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and 
explicates (513).   
 
Thomas argues the case study is comprised of two elements: the subject of the study, which 
refers to the instance of some phenomenon, and the object of the study which is the phenomenon 
itself, or the analytical or theoretical frame (Thomas 513). For the purposes of this thesis, the 
subject is the IRM’s decision to end abstention and the object is the impact of 
identity/ontological security on that decision. This differentiation between the subject and object 
is critical because it allows social scientists to explain not only the “what” questions but the 
“why” questions as well (Thomas 513). For example, what happened to the IRM during the 
Troubles will be explored but, just as importantly, the thesis seeks to demonstrate why this 
happened. A case study allows the inquirer to demonstrate that something has to be explained 
(the object) as well as to advance an explanation for that phenomenon (the analysis of the 
circumstances of a subject) (Thomas 513).     
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 Importantly, a case study is not seen as a method in and of itself. A case study defines 
what is to be studied, and may incorporate other methods in order to study the case (Thomas 
512). In the case of this thesis, discourse analysis is utilized; the process of deconstructing an 
event or outcome into a series of observations which produces an explanation. This thesis 
deconstructs the process by which the position of abstention taken by Sein Fein in 1905 to 
participating in formal politics ended with the taking up of seats in Leinster House during the 
Troubles. Each of these observations represents a critical event that changed the context in which 
the IRM operated, in turn shaping the way in which IRM members saw themselves and their 
goals. Making sense of this process is achieved through the theoretical framework of ontological 
security. Ontological security refers to security of self-identity and involves experiencing oneself 
as a whole, continuous person through time
8
. Ontological security is premised on the notion that 
individuals need to feel secure in their identities in order to realize a sense of agency, requiring 
continuity within and between their actions as well as the way they think of themselves. This 
concept will be more thoroughly explained in the next section of this chapter. Discourse analysis 
assists in explaining how actors are concerned with ontological security as it uncovers the 
biographical narrative of a group and also demonstrates “how a discourse’s effects constitute 
certain type of action” (Steele 11). As will be discussed subsequently, the biographical narrative 
of a group must be consistent with the group’s self-concepts because agency requires a stable 
environment. Actors create meaning for their actions in order to demonstrate this balance and to 
legitimize changes in self-concepts. This is accomplished in the biographical narrative, wherein 
groups justify a policy or action by explaining what the policy or action means in relation to their 
self-identity. In order to determine how the timing of ending abstention relates to the timing of 
                                                          
8
 This concept will be explained in more detail in the following section. 
 
 
7 
the Troubles, Chapter Four analyzes the discourse used by high-ranking and influential IRM 
members before, during, and after the motion was passed. This analysis uncovers how the IRM 
created meaning for such a substantial change in their routines and, also, how they viewed and 
acted on threats to their self-concepts.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 This thesis posits that the period known as the Troubles played an instrumental role in the 
decision to end abstention and to take up seats in legislative assemblies. However, understanding 
this connection requires an analysis of abstention, the Troubles and the decision to end 
abstention. To analyze this relationship, this thesis employs the theoretical model of ontological 
security as understood by Jennifer Mitzen and Brent J. Steele. This theoretical framework builds 
on the assumptions of traditional security studies in order to address matters that the rational 
actor model has difficulty attending to. Traditional security studies often derive their 
assumptions from schools such as realism and liberalism which posit that rational behaviour is 
based on calculations of physical security and economic prosperity. Ontological security argues 
that this only explains some aspects of behaviour. This theory suggests that much of the actions 
of both individuals and groups are based on maintaining their ontological security—that is, these 
actions satisfy the self-identity needs of the individual or group. Collectives seek to maintain a 
consistent self-identity because identity is viewed as a narrative through which agency is made 
possible. In her article, Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 
Dilemma, Mitzen addresses the role of agency in ontological security which is worth quoting at 
length: 
Ontological security refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole, 
continuous person in time—as being rather than constantly changing—in 
 
 
8 
order to realize a sense of agency. Individuals need to feel secure in who 
they are, as identities or selves. Some, deep forms of uncertainty threaten 
this identity security. The reason is that agency requires a stable and 
cognitive environment. Where an actor has no idea what to expect, she 
cannot systematically relate ends to means, and it becomes unclear how 
to pursue her ends. Since ends are constitutive of identity, in turn, deep 
uncertainty renders the actor’s identity insecure. Individuals are therefore 
motivated to create cognitive and behavioural certainty, which they do by 
establishing routines” (342).  
 
Mitzen goes on to explain that, for theorists of ontological security, self-identity is formed and 
sustained through social relationships. Therefore, actors achieve consistency and, by extension, 
agency, by “routinizing their relations with significant others” (Mitzen 342). Steele expands on 
this concept, noting that “these routines can be disrupted when a [group] realizes that its 
narrative actions no longer reflect or are reflected by how it sees itself” (Steele 3). When these 
moments of crisis cause a change in self-identity, a group will attempt to “re-establish routines 
that can, once again, consistently maintain self-identity” (Steele 3). However, the connection 
between new routines and the identity of a collective must be made explicit, because, according 
to Anthony F. Lang, “only in the telling of the event does it acquire meaning, the meaning that 
makes such events politically relevant” (Steele 10). This final point requires a deeper 
understanding of the two foundational features of ontological security. 
 Ontological security is composed of two mutually constitutive elements that are 
important for the purposes of this thesis: self-concepts and the biographical narrative. Self-
concepts simply refer to how a group sees itself and the actions it pursues. All of these self-
concepts culminate in the biographical narrative, which is the “story or stories by means of 
which self-identity is reflexively understood, both by the [group] concerned and by others” 
(Steele 10). The biographical narrative links the implications of an action with a description or 
understanding of a state of “self’ (Steele 10). Importantly, self-concepts do not generally occupy 
 
 
9 
a conscious space—they are not something that is routinely thought about, until they are 
disrupted or challenged. As previously mentioned, this challenge is usually preceded by a crisis. 
When a crisis leads to a change in self-concepts, the biographical narrative must be re-imagined 
in order to connect new routines to self-identity. The biographical narrative allows actors to 
“create meanings for their actions to be logically consistent with their identities. This means that 
[groups] must explain, justify, and/or ‘argue’ what a policy would mean about their sense of self-
identity” (Steele 11).    
 The analytical lens offered by ontological security helps make sense of the connection 
between abstention, ending abstention and the Troubles. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
Troubles are considered a crisis that challenged the self-concepts of the IRM. It is argued that 
events throughout the period caused the IRM to reflect on their success in terms of their role as 
the principal group still fighting for Irish sovereignty. Through these moments, it became 
apparent that the self-concepts of the IRM increasingly lacked resonance with its biographical 
narrative. That is, the military self-concept represented by the IRA and the armed struggle was 
no longer seen as the most important avenue for securing the unification of Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland
9
. The solution to the ontological insecurity generated by this imbalance 
was to re-establish the connection between self-concepts and biographical narrative. In this case, 
the decision to end abstention and enlarge the importance of the political self-concept represents 
the change in action that the IRM embraced. However, in order to accomplish this 
transformation, the IRM had to justify the decision through its biographical narrative. By 
applying discourse analysis to various speeches, policy documents, IRM newspapers, 
autobiographies and interviews, the thesis illustrates how the leadership was able to reimagine 
                                                          
9
 In 1949, the Republic of Ireland was established encompassing the twenty-six counties of the South.  
 
 
10 
their self-concepts in order to legitimize the abandonment of abstention. This explains not only 
why, but how, the IRM ended abstention in 1986.    
 
Implications of Study 
 This study has two important implications: it seeks, in the context of Ireland’s recent 
history, an alternative explanation as to what drove social action in that state and, through this 
explanation, generate insight into the study of such deep rooted conflicts. First, as previously 
noted, the thesis builds on the work of Mitzen and Steele. These authors offer an explanation for 
behaviour that builds on that of traditional security studies, which assume that rational behaviour 
is based primarily on securing physical integrity or economic prosperity. On the other hand, 
Mitzen and Steele also equate action to the identity needs of collectives. Such an approach 
overcomes the dilemma of why some actors behave in a way that would be considered irrational 
in traditional security studies. These studies give primacy to the physical integrity of an actor, 
and it is therefore difficult to explain why some actors pursue actions that threaten their physical 
security.  
 In the case of the IRM, the commitment to the physical force tradition, and to the violent 
armed campaign of 1968-98, does not equate with a rational concern for one’s survival. The IRM 
very much recognized that the power to change the political status of Ireland ultimately rested in 
the hands of British politicians, because the ill-equipped and moderately sized IRM was taking 
on the behemoth that was the British Army. The armed campaign was never expected to force 
the British to surrender, but to force the British to the negotiating table through a sustained 
military campaign that generated not only fear, but economic and political consequences for the 
British trying to maintain control (Smith 97-125). The fact that this strategy posed a very high 
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risk to the physical security of members was well-known and accepted. The PIRA’s 1977 Green 
Book set forth the history, aims and methodology of the movement, and made it clear to all new 
recruits that   
potential volunteers must realise that the threat of capture and of long jail 
sentences are a very real danger and a shadow which hangs over every 
volunteer…Again all people wishing to join the Army must fully realise 
that when life is being taken, that very well could mean their own. If you 
go out to shoot soldiers or police you must fully realize that they can 
shoot you. Life in an underground army is extremely harsh and hard, 
cruel and  disillusioning at times. So before any person decides to join 
the Army he should think seriously about the whole thing (2-3).    
 
The violence, destruction and death that engulfed Northern Ireland during the Troubles 
would have been enough to convince any recruit or aspiring member that joining the cause meant 
putting one’s life on the line, and this official document all but confirms those beliefs. However, 
throughout the period of the Troubles, the IRM enjoyed a fair degree of support in terms of both 
membership and assistance from the communities they were obliged to protect. The threat to 
their physical security did not deter members and supporters from participating, and therefore, 
the behaviour of the IRM is not easily understood by the rational actor model proposed by 
traditional security studies. In this context, this thesis proposes that ontological security is better 
equipped to explain the actions of the IRM.        
 The second proposition of the thesis is that understanding conflict in terms of ontological 
security generates insight applicable to conflict resolution. This inference is an extension of the 
first proposition: the privileging of rational decision making based on physical security and 
economic prosperity. These traditional methods of understanding the conflict between the IRM 
and the British have difficulty explaining the behaviour of the former as far as their commitment 
to physical force is concerned. Ontological security offers insights that are more adept for 
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drawing conclusions regarding such “irrational” behaviour. Ontological security determines that, 
“where conflict persists and comes to fulfill identity needs, breaking free can generate 
ontological insecurity, which states seek to avoid” (Mitzen 343). In this context, the violent 
conflict with the British during the Troubles fulfilled the self-identity needs of the IRM, despite 
the fact that it put their physical security at risk. Approaching this conflict from an ontological 
security standpoint, it becomes clear that physical security and economic prosperity did not 
motivate the IRM. Therefore, as Mitzen argues, “inter-state routines must be attended to in 
attempts to end recurrent conflict” (343). The research implication is that understanding the 
impact of identity on behaviour helps address the problem of bringing an end to conflicts. In this 
case, the Troubles caused a crisis for the self-identity of the IRM because a number of events 
forced them to reflect on the connection between their self-concepts and their biographical 
narrative. When it became obvious that the military self-concept could not alone fulfill the 
narrative goal of uniting Ireland, the IRM changed their routines by increasing the importance of 
their political self-concept. This change was a necessary precursor to the ability of the IRM to 
engage in peace negotiations just a few years later.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 This thesis proceeds through five chapters. Chapter one provides a brief history of the 
IRM and its traditions, with a particular focus on the issue of abstention and the mutually 
constituted relationship of Sinn Fein and the IRA as the embodiment of the IRM. Throughout its 
history, the question of enlarging the political ambitions and endeavours of the IRM was a highly 
contentious one; the question of taking seats in what were considered illegitimate governing 
institutions caused a number of official splits in the IRM. Knowing this history is critical to 
understanding why the decision to take up seats in 1986 was so important. Not only did 1986 
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mark the first time the IRM did not split over the question of formally participating in politics, 
but it is counterintuitive in that abstention was a central aspect of the movement’s identity.  
 Chapter two discusses the critical period of time known as the Troubles. This Chapter has 
two principal goals. First, it situates the thesis amongst the contemporary literature concerning 
the Troubles and explores the causes and dynamics of the period. Second, this thesis argues that 
the Troubles have explanatory power for understanding the decision to formally participate in 
politics. A number of occurrences throughout the Troubles created moments of reflection that 
challenged the IRM’s self-concepts and their ability to fulfill their biographical narrative with the 
use of the military self-concept alone. Events such as the ceasefires that took place during the 
Troubles and the Hunger Strikes in 1981 forced the IRM to reimagine their past and current 
activities in light of new developments. Taken as a whole, it is posited that the events of the 
Troubles created a threat to the IRM’s sense of self, eventually forcing the enlargement of their 
political self-concept and leading to the end of abstention in 1986. The chapter concludes by 
arguing that the Troubles created the context for change in the policy regarding abstention and 
that this transformation is best understood through the lens of ontological security. 
 Chapter Three offers a synopsis of ontological security. The two main proponents 
applying ontological security to group behaviour, Jennifer Mitzen and Brent J. Steele, draw their 
theories from the sociologically oriented work of Anthony Giddens. The theoretical models 
employed by all three authors are explored. Building on this overview, the chapter defines two 
central elements of role theory and ontological security: self-concepts and the biographical 
narrative. Self-concepts refer to how a group sees itself and makes sense of the actions it pursues 
while the biographical narrative is the story through which those concepts are reflexively 
understood. Both self-concepts and biographical narrative need to be aligned in order for a group 
 
 
14 
to feel as though they have agency. These terms will be of utmost importance in the application 
of role theory and ontological security to the case in question. 
 Chapter Four assesses the research problem outlined in chapter two using the theoretical 
framework that was detailed in Chapter Three. This analysis demonstrates how the events of the 
Troubles challenged the effectiveness of the military self-concept for fulfilling the goals of the 
biographical narrative of the IRM, eventually leading to the enlargement of their political self-
concept in the form of ending abstention. This analysis is accomplished through a series of 
observations which connect ontological security and identity-needs to the actions of the IRM 
throughout the Troubles, up to and including ending abstention. To this end, chapter four is 
composed of six sub-sections: the first sub-section is dedicated to outlining the self-concepts of 
the movement at the start of the Provisional era; sub-sections two through five discuss each of 
the observations in turn; and sub-section six provides a meta-narrative concerning the 
observations, the Troubles and the end of abstention. The observations are analysed in regards to 
how they challenged the IRM’s self-concepts; how these challenges created dissonance with 
their biographical narrative; and finally, how the need for resonance between self-concepts and 
biographical narrative influenced the rebalancing of self-concepts. These observations include: 
the Lower Falls Curfew in 1970; the 1972 IRA ceasefire; the 1975 IRA ceasefire; and, the 1981-
2 Hunger Strikes. The Chapter concludes by tying all of the observations together into a meta-
narrative that identifies the Troubles as a crisis that challenged the IRM’s sense of self, which 
eventually led to the decision to formally participate in political institutions.  
 Finally, this thesis concludes by summarising the argument presented, discussing the 
implications of the case study, and suggesting ways that the insights generated by this thesis can 
be applied to understanding conflict.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 Chapter one explores the evolution of the IRM from the 1916 Easter Uprising to the 
emergence of the Provisional movement in the late 1960s. This Chapter provides the history and 
context of  the rise of Sinn Fein and the IRA as the two halves composing the IRM with the 
intent of highlighting their mutually constituted relationship. An investigation of this history will 
demonstrate that, although the IRA and Sinn Fein are separate entities with different histories 
and serve different functions as the two elements that constitute the IRM, they share common 
foundational principles that have come to define the IRM as a whole. Understanding this 
complex history clarifies both how important the concept of abstention is to the IRM, as well as 
why the IRA and Sinn Fein must be treated as mutually constituted elements in the history of the 
IRM. Furthermore, this historical background sets the necessary context for understanding the 
importance of the Troubles and, importantly for this thesis, the decision to end abstention. This 
will be the focus of Chapter Two.   
 This Chapter is divided into three sections that analyze the effects of three historical 
periods on the IRM: section one focuses on the 1916 Easter Uprising; section two discusses the 
post-Anglo-Irish Treaty era; and, section three discusses the IRM in the period between 1926 and 
1969. The first section discusses how the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein as the two 
components of the IRM developed as a result of the Rising. The relationship between these two 
organizations would henceforth be shaped by their commitment to abstention and the ideals of 
the Republic of 1916 as the foundational principles of the IRM, beginning with the first split in 
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the IRM over the Anglo-Irish Treaty
10
. The second section of the Chapter discusses how varying 
degrees of commitment to abstention within the IRM caused a split within the movement in the 
years following the implementation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The recurring debate over ending 
abstention caused contention within the IRM between those members who were willing to 
compromise on the ideals of 1916 and those who were fiercely devoted to the Republic of 1916 
and the abstention policy. The third and final section of the Chapter provides a brief overview of 
IRM after the split that occurred in 1926, where the IRA and Sinn Fein became disassociated 
from one another. However, when the IRA began planning a new campaign in the 1950s, Sinn 
Fein was the only legitimate option in terms of a political partner because they had upheld the 
foundational values of the IRM established in 1916. Following the failure of the 1950s 
campaign, Sinn Fein and the IRA, once again united in their roles as the mutually constituted 
elements of the IRM, took a turn toward Marxism in the early 1960s. The Marxist doctrine that 
influenced the IRM leadership during this period deemphasized the role of armed conflict in 
favour of implementing a social and economic programme, which implied the necessity for 
taking seats in government. The IRM split once again in 1969 over the issue of ending 
abstention, but what emerged in the aftermath of that split was a united, progressive, IRM that 
dominated Northern Ireland’s political and social landscape for the next two decades—a period 
now known simply as the Troubles.       
                                                          
10
 There were numerous splits between the IRA and Sinn Fein throughout their history and also within these two 
institutions themselves. Whenever these divisions occurred it was the group that remained steadfast in their 
loyalty to the 1916 Republic and the principles that derived from that event who were able to retain ownership of 
the IRM label as well as the official names Sinn Fein and IRA. The groups that parted from those loyalties were 
forced to adopt new titles that did not carry the history and weight of the aforementioned names.  
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The 1916 Easter Uprising  
 The Easter Rising of 1916 affected the IRM in three ways: first, the relationship between 
Sinn Fein and the IRA was established and these two organizations would come to be the two 
mutually constituted elements of the IRM, Sinn Fein representing the political voice of the 
movement and the IRA being the armed component; second, the abstention policy became a 
fundamental aspect of the IRM and played an important role in shaping the relationship between 
Sinn Fein and the IRA; and, lastly, the documents that were meant to settle the conflict caused 
the first split in the IRM between members who compromised on the abstention policy and those 
who viewed any compromise as traitorous to the Republic proclaimed in 1916. This analysis 
demonstrates the centrality of abstention to the IRM and the mutually constituted relationship 
between the IRA and Sinn Fein that is shaped by the abstention principle. A brief overview of 
the Easter Rising underscores how this event serves as one of the most important symbols in the 
modern IRM.  
 In 1916, a small group of men from the Irish Republican Brotherhood
11
 organised a 
military revolt with help from the Irish Volunteers
12
, the Irish Citizen Army
13
 and Cumann na 
mBan
14
 (Feeney 57). These rebels seized the General Post Office (GPO) and other key areas in 
Dublin on April 24. The Rising is considered a turning point in Irish history as it established the 
thirty-two county Republic
15
 that the IRM claims allegiance to. The “Proclamation of the 
Republic” that was recited by the Irish forces when they took the GPO is considered the 
                                                          
11
 A fraternal organization dedicated to Irish independence. 
12
 An organization of Irish nationalists formed in 1913. 
13
 A group consisting of trained trade union members for the purpose of protecting workers from police at 
demonstrations. 
14
 An all-women paramilitary formed in 1914 as an auxiliary of the Irish Volunteers. 
15
 Historically, Ireland consists of thirty-two counties. Through partition, the six counties out of the nine that made 
up historical Ulster were constituted as Northern Ireland which remained part of the UK, and the twenty-six 
counties to the South became the Irish Free State. 
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“foundational document for the independent Irish state” (Hart 1). The document declared the 
right of the Irish people to ownership and governance over Ireland, as opposed to “the long 
usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government” (Smith 30). The rebels fought for 
six days, at which point they were captured by the British, ninety people were sentenced to 
death, not all of them leaders or even participants in the conflict, and over 3,000 men across the 
island were imprisoned. 
 The first effect of the Uprising on the IRM was the emergent relationship between the 
militant supporters of the Republic who would come to be known as the IRA
16
 and the political 
organization known as Sinn Fein. This relationship ultimately began as somewhat of an accident: 
the Easter Uprising had been incorrectly dubbed the “Sinn Fein Rising” (Feeney 55-61). Sinn 
Fein was an organization founded by Arthur Griffith in 1904-5 that advanced the following set of 
policies: abstaining from sending Irish MPs to Westminster; peaceful resistance and opposition 
to physical force; a dual monarchy wherein Ireland and Britain would have the same monarch, 
but with two parliaments separate and independent from each other; and self-sufficiency through 
the use of Irish approaches to Irish problems (Coogan 26-8; Feeney 18-43; Maillot 8). The 
opposition to physical force and commitment to monarchism did not suit the IRA, but in need of 
a public face and recognizing the opportunities presented by a swell of national support for their 
cause and the use of physical force in the post-Rising period, the leadership of the IRA under 
Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera assumed control of the Sinn Fein banner
17
. The peaceful 
                                                          
16
 The various volunteer organizations of the 1916 Rising did not officially become the IRA until after 1918, when 
the Dail Eireann, which will be discussed later, recognized the volunteers as their official Army.  
17
 There were already significant ties between the IRA and Sinn Fein previous to the establishment of this 
relationship. Arthur Griffith himself was a member of the Irish Volunteers, one of the groups that contributed 
members during the 1916 Rising (although Griffith himself did not participate). This was typical of many members 
of Sinn Fein; they were simultaneously members of the groups that participated in, or at the very least supported, 
the Rising and the principles that emerged in its aftermath. Therefore, when the leaders of the IRA embarked on 
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resistance and dual monarchy principles were abandoned in favour of an armed campaign and 
political independence in the form of a Republic, while the abstention policy was maintained as 
it resonated with the IRA’s values of independence from Britain (Feeney 18-43; Maillot 8-9). 
The fact that the IRA assumed control of Sinn Fein is an important one: as a result of the belief 
that the armed struggle perpetrated by the IRA could achieve more toward establishing a 
Republic than the political avenues that would have been pursued by Sinn Fein, the IRA assumed 
the more powerful position in this relationship and in the IRM as a whole. The latter point will 
be elaborated on in the following paragraphs.    
The second effect of the Uprising was that abstention became a fundamental principle of 
the IRM. The 1918 general election was the first opportunity that the IRM was given to 
demonstrate that they had the support of the Irish electorate in regard to the establishment of a 
thirty-two county independent Republic. In pursuit of this victory, the IRM leadership under 
Collins and de Valera, intent on fulfilling the goals of the Proclamation, fought the December 
1918 Westminster general election under the Sinn Fein banner and on an abstentionist ticket. 
This meant that elected Sinn Fein candidates would abstain from taking their seat in 
Westminster, and would instead form their own assembly (Maillot 9-10). When the IRM won 
seventy-three seats out of one hundred and five in the election
18
 under the Sinn Fein banner, the 
IRM leadership read the outcome as “the people of Ireland’s overwhelming support for 
independence in the shape of a republic…it was a retrospective endorsement of the 1916 Rising” 
(Feeney 110). The newly elected representatives abstained from their seats at Westminster and 
instead gathered in the Mansion House in Dublin and formed a new parliament: the Dail 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
uniting the two organizations, it was not difficult to assume control of the leadership of Sinn Fein as they already 
had the support of many of the membership through the armed component of the movement. 
18
 Because this election took place before the partition of Ireland, this was an all-Ireland election. 
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Eireann
19
 (Maillot 10). Although it was never officially recognized by the British, the creation of 
a government institution, completely independent of the British, legitimated by the votes of the 
Irish electorate, represented the greatest success for those who opposed British rule. The 
abstention policy allowed the IRM to both demonstrate support for their actions through electoral 
votes and to set up an elected assembly based on that support. For them, abstention came to be 
viewed as something “more than a tactic, it was an essential key to independence” (Maillot 10). 
The importance of abstention was closely related to another guiding principle that 
emerged in the aftermath of the Easter Rising: the idea that the use of physical force, in contrast 
to politics, was the primary strategy for achieving Irish independence. In regard to the 
relationship between Sinn Fein and the IRA, wherein the armed struggle perpetrated by the IRA 
was given precedence, the IRM leadership read the electoral support for Sinn Fein as a vote 
supporting the goals of the 1916 Easter Rising; that is, a vote for a continued armed campaign to 
oust the British, with politics merely operating in the background until independence had been 
fully realized (Feeney 118-120). At the meeting in the Mansion House to inaugurate the Dail, a 
number of IRA members ambushed and killed two Royal Irish Constabulary officers, the armed 
police force for the United Kingdom in Ireland; this event is widely recognised as the beginning 
of the War of Independence (Feeney 119). By prioritizing the armed campaign of the IRA 
through those attacks over the proceedings of the First Dail, the military faction of the IRM 
demonstrated that they believed that the armed campaign was the primary tool for achieving Irish 
                                                          
19
 At its inaugural meeting on January 21 1919, the members of the First Dail established the main resolutions of 
the parliamentary assembly: a constitution, a declaration of independence, an address to the free nations of the 
world, and a democratic programme. However, despite its importance to Irish republicans past and present, the 
First Dail Eireann was not internationally recognized as a legitimate governing institution. In addition to this lack of 
recognition and therefore international support, the British banned the First Dail in September 1919. This caused 
the membership to suspend participation in traditional political activity and forced them to operate underground 
where, in the context of the War of Independence, they had little ability to implement public policy or operate as a 
coherent and functional political institution.     
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independence. Although they shared leadership, goals and represented the two halves of the 
IRM, Sinn Fein was relegated to the role of organising elections and propaganda while the IRA 
would be the main tool through which victory in the form of Irish independence would be won 
(Maillot 5).  
A number of features in the nature and timing of the attack illustrate the subordinate 
position of politics and Sinn Fein to the armed element of the IRM represented by the IRA. The 
armed campaign had been suspended in the run-up to the election; if violence had been allowed, 
it could have easily gotten out of control, Sinn Fein would be blamed for it and their electoral 
success greatly diminished.  There is no evidence to show that those who perpetrated the attack 
either knew or cared about the inaugural meeting of the Dail. In fact, one of those involved later 
stated they had simply become fed up with forgoing the armed campaign to undertake political 
activities: they “were in great danger of becoming merely a political adjunct to the Sinn Fein 
organisation…We had enough of being pushed around” (Feeney 119). For these and men like 
them, the Republic would only be achieved by force and Sinn Fein’s electoral victory provided 
them the moral right to continue to fight for independence. This incident sparked a string of 
similar attacks that rapidly evolved into the War of Independence. In the guerilla-type warfare 
that the IRA engaged in, Sinn Fein had very little to do as a political party and thus their role 
became increasingly irrelevant in the actions of the IRM. 
 The final effect of the 1916 Rising is related to British intervention in Ireland and the 
lasting effects that would have on the IRM. Through two pieces of British legislation, the 
Government of Ireland Act and the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the importance of Sinn Fein’s role in the 
IRM was undermined and a major transformation of the relationship between the political and 
military wings of the IRM took place. In 1920, the British passed the Government of Ireland Act. 
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The Act would grant Home Rule to Ireland, administered through one parliament in Belfast and 
another in Dublin, both remaining part of the United Kingdom (UK) but effectively establishing 
a partition of Ireland (Feeney 130; Maillot 11). Taking the view that a partitioned Ireland was not 
the Republic that was fought for in 1916 and was therefore unacceptable, the IRM once again ran 
Sinn Fein candidates for both the northern and southern parliaments on an abstentionist ticket 
(Feeney 130-2). In the general election of 1921, Sinn Fein returned one-hundred and twenty-four 
unopposed candidates for the southern parliament; in the North, the Ulster Party that represented 
unionists secured forty out of the fifty-two seats and Sinn Fein won six seats (Feeney 132-3; 
Maillot 11). The elected Sinn Fein candidates from both the North and South assembled and 
declared themselves members of the Second Dail. Despite the importance of the Second Dail to 
the IRM it was not recognized by the British. King George V opened the Belfast parliament in 
June 1921 and Northern Ireland was established (Feeney 134). Due to the strength of the Ulster 
Party in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein ceased to have a political influence there as early as 1922. 
As a result of the War of Independence that began with the attacks on the RIC in 1919, Home 
Rule was never even implemented in the twenty-six counties and Prime Minister of England 
David Lloyd George offered a truce to negotiate a settlement. Negotiations ended with the 1921 
Anglo-Irish Treaty, which caused a split between those IRM members that supported the Treaty 
and those members that saw it as a betrayal of the Republic of 1916.   
The Anglo-Irish Treaty established the Irish Free State by providing self-governing 
authority to the twenty-six counties, and its acceptance by the pro-Treaty IRM leadership was a 
contentious issue that caused the movement to fracture and led to civil war. Pro-Treaty IRM 
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members, led by Michael Collins
20
 and Arthur Griffith
21
, saw the Anglo-Irish Treaty as a 
stepping stone to full independence (Maillot 12).The anti-Treaty IRM members were led by 
Eamon de Valera
22
, president of Sinn Fein as well as president of the Second Dail. This faction 
held steadfast to the Republic “that they were sworn to defend, which Sinn Fein had endorsed as 
its aim in the 1917 ard fheis and which the IRA had fought for since 1919” (Feeney 135). The 
two major disagreements between these groups revolved around their varying degrees of 
allegiance to the principles of the Republic of 1916 and their willingness to engage in British-
constituted parliaments.  
The first point of contention between pro- and anti-Treaty members was that the Treaty 
provided Northern Ireland the opportunity to opt out of the Irish Free State and solidify the 
partition implemented by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. Collins believed that once the 
political element of the IRM led by Sinn Fein was  able to self-govern in the twenty-six counties, 
they could regain Northern Ireland soon after, while the de Valera division upheld that this 
undermined the thirty-two country Republic of 1916. Due to the nature of the partition
23
 
Northern Ireland did exercise this option and remained a part of the UK. The realisation of 
permanent partition caused resentment among anti-Treaty members and left republicans in 
                                                          
20
 A respected member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (one of the organizations that fought in the 1916 
Rising and a predecessor to the IRA) who fought alongside the leadership at the GPO during the Easter Rising. 
Collins became one of the leaders of the independence movement following the Rising and became one of the 
leaders of Sinn Fein with Griffith and de Valera. Following the War of Independence, Collins was a signatory of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty and one of the leaders of the pro-Treatyites.  
21
 Griffith was the founder of Sinn Fein. He led the independence movement alongside Collins and de Valera and 
also became one of the leaders of the pro-Treatyites.  
22
 De Valera was one of the leaders of the independence movement alongside Collins and Griffith. De Valera 
opposed the Anglo-Irish Treaty and led the charge against the Irish Free State during the Civil War. De Valera 
managed to appropriate Sinn Fein in 1923 from former members that entered the Free State government. 
However, in 1926 he left Sinn Fein to establish his own party, Fianna Fail, when his motion to end abstention 
failed. 
23
 Northern Ireland consists of six of the nine counties of the historical province of Ulster. The nature of partition 
was such that a unionist majority was ensured by only including the six counties in Northern Ireland, as the 
remaining three would have swung the balance in favour of a majority Catholic/nationalist population. 
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Northern Ireland feeling abandoned by the cause
24
. The second conflict emerging from the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty arose due to the fact that the Irish Free State would not be a Republic, but an 
autonomous dominion of the British Empire with the British Monarch as head of state. 
Furthermore, IRM leaders would have to swear an oath of allegiance to King George. Obviously 
this was diametrically opposed to anti-Treaty ideals, in which complete political independence 
from the UK was central. Despite the protests of anti-Treaty members, the Treaty was accepted 
by a vote in the Dail in January of 1922, and the first split in the IRM took place. The pro-Treaty 
IRM leadership won the 1922 election that inaugurated the Irish Free State under the Sinn Fein 
banner, and de Valera continued to oppose the Treaty along with the anti-Treaty faction. The 
fighting between the Irish Free State forces and the anti-Treaty IRM members between 1922 and 
1923 is known as the Irish Civil War. 
The Irish Civil War led to first split in the IRM over the issue of participating in 
parliaments other than the First and Second Dails that were established through the use of 
abstention and supported by the majority of the Irish electorate. Following the break, those pro-
Treaty members of the new Irish Free State government officially abandoned Sinn Fein, severed 
ties to the IRA and the armed campaign against the British, and focused on repressing the 
activities of those opposed to the new Free State during the Civil War: “meetings were broken 
up, documents seized and anyone or any organisation suspected of being opposed to the new 
Free State government relentlessly harassed” (Feeney 156). The severing of ties with Sinn Fein 
and the IRA meant the pro-Treaty members that formed the new government were no longer 
associated with the IRM, and the IRM was now being led by anti-Treaty members under de 
                                                          
24
 Collins, Griffith and de Valera all knew that running on an abstentionist ticket in the North would not be 
successful. The Unionist Party was strong in the North, and not taking their seats would mean republicans would 
have no say in the new parliament.  
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Valera. The IRM continued to fight against the Treaty but were not well organised or prepared to 
take on the Free State forces. As a result, when the IRA chief-of-staff issued an order to discard 
all armaments possessed by the Army in May of 1923, de Valera supported the move and the 
IRM ceased their physical force campaign. By June of that year de Valera was successful in 
appropriating the Sinn Fein banner that had been abandoned by the pro-Treaty leadership. As a 
result of the split described above, the IRM now consisted of members so uncompromising that 
“they were even dubious about using the name Sinn Fein because it had monarchial 
connotations” (Feeney 156). As is discussed in the following section, while the role of Sinn Fein 
would see a brief invigoration under his leadership, the influence and membership of the IRM in 
the post-Anglo-Irish Treaty era declined as a result of their respective commitment to abstention 
and the leadership of new Irish Free State government gradually gained popular support.  
The Post-Anglo-Irish Treaty Era 
 The split in the IRM that occurred over the Anglo-Irish Treaty had severe consequences 
for the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein as well as the concept of abstention. The 
function of the following section is to address the two fundamental characteristics of the IRM in 
the post-Treaty era: first, for the most part, Sinn Fein and the IRA grew distant in the years 
following the Anglo-Irish Treaty; and, second, the commitment to abstention ensured that Sinn 
Fein played no significant role in the politics of the island for a very long time while the IRA’s 
commitment to armed insurrection in a time of relative peace both decreased their operations 
significantly as well as relegated  what little action they took largely inconsequential. The intent 
of this section is to demonstrate how the relationship between Sinn Fein and the IRA as the two 
mutually constituted elements of the IRM has been shaped by their commitment to abstention. 
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  After the Civil War and the defeat of the anti-Treaty IRM members by the Free State 
Forces, de Valera fought hard to retain continuity with the past through the appropriation of the 
IRA and Sinn Fein as well as his following of staunch IRM members, only to abandon the 
movement three years later when he put forward a motion to end abstention and failed. The 
ensuing De Valera departure had the effect of completely separating Sinn Fein from the IRA and 
had enormous consequences for abstention. As already mentioned, appropriating Sinn Fein had 
become extremely important for de Valera after the Civil War. As de Valera saw it,  
whoever owned the name could claim copyright of republicanism 
and the continuity of the movement that had won the elections of 
1918, 1920 and 1921 and expressed the self-determination of the 
Irish people. It would also be possible to claim that Sinn Fein 
remained the political embodiment of the self-determination of the 
Irish people (Feeney 136).  
 
It was not until 1923 that de Valera was able to overcome the supporters of the Free State 
government, appropriate the name Sinn Fein and fill the organization with his own supporters, 
effectively taking over the IRM
25
 (Feeney 137). One of the IRM’s first actions under de Valera 
was to pass a resolution for Sinn Fein agreeing to abstain from the Free State parliament that had 
been elected in 1922. The IRM would only recognise the Second Dail (1921), claiming that this 
was the last time the Irish people voted as a nation. Although the party performed far better in 
the 1923 Free State elections than most observers thought they would, obtaining 27% of the vote 
(Maillot 12), de Valera observed that there was not much taste for abstention in the Free State 
(Feeney 140).  
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 Although the Free State government had all but abandoned Sinn Fein, they were reluctant to allow de Valera to 
appropriate the party: Free State supporters “stymied every attempt by de Valera and his supporters to take over 
the organisation…[they] began to crack down mercilessly on anti-Treatyites of every description, military or 
political” (Feeney 156). Unable to get the Sinn Fein members-turned-Free State officials to reconvene, he and his 
supporters set up their own committee structure and membership and appropriated the name Sinn Fein. 
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 As a result, de Valera sought a compromise on the oath of allegiance in order to enable 
Sinn Fein candidates to take part in the Free State parliament (Maillot 13). As early as the 1925 
annual ard fheis, de Valera proposed that: “once the admission oaths26 of the twenty-six-county 
and six-county assemblies are removed, it becomes a question not of principles but of policy 
whether or not [IRM] representatives should attend these assemblies” (Maillot 13). Opponents of 
this view felt that sending candidates to any legislature that was set up by British law was 
“injurious to the honour of Ireland” (Maillot 13). The IRM split over the issue in 1926, when de 
Valera introduced a motion to enter the southern parliament at Sinn Fein’s annual ard fheis, 
which failed by two votes. De Valera and his supporters then established their own party, Fianna 
Fail, while those who opposed him remained part of Sinn Fein. Importantly, on the eve of the ard 
fheis in which de Valera proposed the motion to end abstention, the IRA Army Council, 
consisting of IRM members who opposed the ending of abstention, severed its ties with Sinn 
Fein. The IRA voted in favour of withdrawing its allegiance to the Second Dail (1921) in order 
to prevent the split in Sinn Fein over the issue of abstention from spreading into its ranks as well 
(Maillot 13). To add insult to injury, by 1932 the IRA openly called for a vote for de Valera’s 
new party (Maillot 13). This demonstrates both the severance of the relationship between Sinn 
Fein and the IRA in the post-Treaty period, as well as the centrality of abstention and taking up 
seats to the splits within the IRM. While in this period the abstention policy caused the IRA and 
Sinn Fein to split, it was the commitment to this policy on the part of those that left De Valera 
that helped re-establish the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein in the 1950s. The next 
section discusses the evolution of the IRA and Sinn Fein after their parting in 1926. 
 
                                                          
26
 Refers to the oath of allegiance to King George that was required of all republican leaders before participating in 
the Free State government.  
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Re-Establishing Ties and Moving to the Left 
 As it stood after 1926, the political and military wings of the IRM were completely 
disassociated from one another. To reiterate, the IRA went so far as to announce its support for 
de Valera’s party, Fianna Fail. However, Sinn Fein’s commitment to abstention and continuity 
with traditional IRM traditions made it the only viable candidate for partnership at a time when 
the IRA was regaining momentum in the 1950s. This section addresses the state of Sinn Fein and 
the IRA after their parting in 1926, the reinvigoration of the relationship between the two in the 
1950s, and their turn to Marxism in the 1960s. Again, the intention of this section is to 
demonstrate the extent to which the IRA and Sinn Fein’s mutually constituted relationship was 
tied to the IRM’s value of abstention.  
In regards to the IRA, after their break with Sinn Fein, the organization had gradually 
become an inflexible, autonomous military organization that was not being regulated by any 
meaningful political authority (Smith 116). The membership of the IRA consisted of staunch, 
hardline, physical-force IRM members who held the traditional belief that the use of arms could 
achieve more than formal political avenues (O’Brien 21). The general view amongst these 
members was “if you fight a war you fight it. If you go into politics you compromise” (O’Brien 
34). As for Sinn Fein, the party had all but lost initiative, direction, support and influence. The 
party had begun to concentrate its efforts on debating the meaning of the IRM rather than doing 
anything to achieve the Republic. For this reason, the IRA did not feel that Sinn Fein had any 
role to play in advancing the Republic (Feeney 174-5); that is until the IRA was reconstituted 
following the Second World War and Sinn Fein was seen as the only viable partner for their new 
strategy. Sinn Fein came to be viewed as the only party that shared the IRA’s political outlook as 
they remained steadfast in their commitment to abstention and to the principles of the Republic 
of 1916.  
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 After the Second World War, the IRA reorganized itself under new leadership, developed 
a new cause and strategy, and rebuilt its relationship with Sinn Fein. In December 1946, the IRA 
membership elected a new Army Council, a new Chief of Staff and a new General Headquarters 
staff (Feeney 185-6). In September 1948, the Army Council held the first general army 
convention since the start of the World War II. At this meeting, three critical decisions were 
made: first, it was agreed that there would be no military operations in the newly-constituted 
Republic of Ireland
27
; second, the IRA would redirect its activities from the Republic of Ireland 
to fighting the British and pushing them out of the North; third, the IRA should no longer be 
isolated from the political world. However, their defining political stance was, and would 
continue to be, abstention (Feeney 187; Smith 118-21). In regard to the last point, the IRA 
recognized that in order to achieve any sense of support from the Irish electorate, the IRM would 
need a political face. For this, they returned to Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein was seen as having the same 
outlook as the IRA: both had  
acquired ownership of the terms ‘republican’ and ‘republican 
movement’…Although Fianna Fail was and is officially known as ‘the 
republican Party’, the name sounds like an afterthought…It was those 
who rejected the Treaty
28
 who continued to be called republicans (Feeney 
163).  
 
Furthermore, Sinn Fein was the only party who shared the IRA’s views regarding abstention29. 
IRA members were instructed to join the party, and at the 1949 ard fheis, leading figures of the 
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 Established in 1949 when the remaining duties of the king were removed from the constitution and Ireland was 
declared a Republic under the Republic of Ireland Act 1948. 
28
 Refers to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. 
29
 Sinn Fein also were also committed to the ideals of the Republic of 1916 and considered themselves an all-
Ireland movement, therefore, their views regarding abstention aligned with the IRA. 
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IRA became senior figures in the party
30
 (Feeney 190; Smith 130), and the IRM once again 
consisted of these two mutual constituted elements.  
 As a result of their relationship with the IRA, Sinn Fein experienced a brief revival in this 
period. More importantly, it was at this time that the political and military wings of the IRM 
once again became inextricably linked, largely due to their commitments to abstention. Sinn Fein 
began reorganising throughout both the Republic of Ireland and the North, and by 1950 there 
was a cumainn
31
 “in every province if not in every county” (Feeney 194). The IRA bombing 
campaign along the border of Northern Ireland that began in 1956 and continued through to 1962 
added to political support for Sinn Fein. In the general election campaign of 1957 in the Republic 
of Ireland, four Sinn Fein candidates were elected to Leinster House (Maillot 15). Despite this 
brief revival in the IRM’s electoral success under Sinn Fein, throughout the five-year campaign 
the IRM lacked the ability to consolidate their political goals and justify the violence (Smith 
130). By 1962 the campaign ended, the IRA had again been defeated and demoralized, and 
support for Sinn Fein significantly decreased. It was at this time that Sinn Fein and the IRA, their 
relationship re-established, took a hard turn to the left. 
 Following the end of border campaign in 1962, the IRM became disillusioned. This 
provided space for the party to take a more radical ideological shift in the early 1960s. Under the 
leadership of Cathal Goulding, who became Chief of Staff of the IRA in 1962, and Tomas 
MacGiolla, who became Sinn Fein President at the same time, the IRM took a turn to the left. 
Although Goulding, MacGiolla and their supporters did not represent the views of the majority 
of IRM members, they formed the leadership of the movement and were in a position to push 
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 By 1948, membership in Sinn Fein was so low that “it would not be a question of the IRA infiltrating Sinn Fein, it 
could simply take over” (Feeney 189).  
31
 Sinn Fein Association. 
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extensive poverty and unemployment as the issues around which to organize a revolution (Smith 
128). The leadership no longer believed that brute military force could alone address the 
problems of modern Ireland. They attempted to ensure that the IRA would end their attachment 
to the armed struggle that was central to the IRM. Similarly, Sinn Fein adopted a Social and 
Economic Programme at the 1964 ard fheis. In order to establish a political policy, the IRM 
would have to drop their commitment to abstention as well as the fight against partition to begin 
formally participating in the political institutions of the time (Feeney 211; Smith 135-6). In the 
unique situation of the North, the goal was to show Catholics and Protestants that it was in their 
social and economic interest to have a united, independent Ireland (Smith 136).  
 Consequently, when people in nationalist areas looked to the IRM for protection from 
increasing loyalist violence in 1969, the leadership faced two predicaments: they could not be 
seen defending Catholics because this ran contrary to the Marxist analysis of leadership; and, the 
IRA lacked military direction due to the reforms that had placed the armed struggle second to 
political avenues (Smith 138). The preoccupation with ending abstention that motivated the IRM 
leadership in the late 1960s distracted them from responding to the increasing violence in the 
North during the Civil Rights Movement, and this blindness caused a split in the IRM that led to 
the establishment of one of the most influential incarnations of the IRM: the Provisional. The 
Provisional were strongly committed to the use of physical force to achieve their objectives. 
However, it would be the Provisional incarnation of the IRM that moved the party and the Army 
toward ending abstention and formally participating in politics without causing a split. 
Understanding why and how they were able to do this requires an awareness of the period in 
which that decision took place and will be explored in detail in the next chapter.  
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Conclusion 
 As this Chapter has demonstrated, the IRA and Sinn Fein are two intrinsically linked 
halves of the IRM that share a common history shaped by the commitment to the long-standing 
tradition of abstention.. This common history began with the 1916 Rising. The 1916 Rising had 
three effects on the IRM: the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein developed in the 
aftermath of the Rising, and together they formed the political and military wing of the IRM; the 
concept of abstention became a fundamental element of the IRM when it led to formation of the 
First Dail (1918) in the spirit of the Republic; and, the documents intended to settle the conflict 
caused the first major split within the IRM over the issue of ending abstention and participating 
in illegitimate parliaments. In the Post-Anglo-Irish Treaty era, there were further splits in the 
IRM over the varying degrees of commitment to abstention. When the Sinn Fein split over de 
Valera’s motion to end abstention in 1926, the Army severed its ties with Sinn Fein and the party 
fell into political oblivion. During this period, both the IRA and Sinn Fein became increasingly 
dogmatic and ideological while their membership and support declined. However, when the IRA 
was re-established following the Second World War and searched for  a political partner to 
support its campaign along the Northern border, Sinn Fein was the only party that shared its 
political outlook; especially in regard to abstention. Sinn Fein and the IRA were once again 
united, and the principle of abstention again played a significant role in this relationship. It 
remained strong through the 1960s when the IRM adopted a Marxist doctrine. Again illustrating 
the centrality of abstention to the IRM and to the relationships between the IRA and Sinn Fein, 
the movement split over the issue of ending the policy in 1969. This split occurred as a result of 
the inability of Marxist doctrine to address the pressing concerns of Catholics and nationalists in 
Northern Ireland. While the leadership was busy debating the need to end abstention in order to 
implement a social and economic programme, a Civil Rights Movement was being established in 
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the North. The Provisional that emerged from this period led the charge against the British 
during what is now known as the Troubles.  
 The extensive historical overview of the IRM discussed in this Chapter focused on two 
fundamental themes: the mutually constituted relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein as the 
embodiment of the IRM as a whole, and the centrality of abstention in defining that relationship. 
This historical background is essential to understanding the magnitude of the decision to end 
abstention in 1986. Not only did 1986 mark the first time the IRM did not split over the question 
of formally participating in politics, but it is counterintuitive in that abstention was a central 
aspect of the movement’s self-concepts, albeit a contentious aspect. In the following Chapter, the 
period in which that decision was made is discussed in great detail. Chapter Two puts forth the 
argument that the Troubles have explanatory power for understanding the decision to formally 
participate in politics. The Troubles played an important role in shaping the identity of the IRM. 
As will be shown, the sectarian violence and direct conflict with the British Army worked to 
legitimize the IRM position in the early years of the Troubles. However, various events 
throughout the period challenged whether the IRM’s strategy was the best means of achieving 
the movement’s stated goals. The following Chapter connects those series of events and 
describes how their collective impact led to the ending of abstention and a re-orienting of the 
IRM’s strategy. 
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Chapter Two 
Introduction  
 Chapter Two focuses on how major events of the Troubles transformed the IRM’s self-
concepts as well as their strategies for ousting the British from Northern Ireland and ending 
partition. It details four critical moments between the years of 1969 and 1986 that challenged 
their self-perceptions. The result of numerous challenges to their self-concepts was an 
atmosphere wherein abstention could be successfully confronted by the leadership who took over 
the movement beginning in the late 1970s. Specifically, the Provisional that emerged as the 
embodiment of the IRM in 1969 was traditional and hardline in that its members viewed the 
armed struggle as the primary means for achieving their goals. However, by 1986, this same 
incarnation of the IRM was ending a decades-long policy to one that required a greater role for 
politics in achieving the movement’s goals, an act which historically caused splits within the 
IRM. This Chapter explores the extent to which timing played a role in this historic decision as 
well as the relatively stable transition from a movement dominated by a commitment to armed 
resistance to one that accepts the importance of participated in politics.  
 Chapter Two consists of two parts.  The first explores the emergence of the Provisional in 
the context of the Civil Rights Movement and the beginning of the Troubles. The second 
describes the evolution of the Provisional during the major events of the period leading up to the 
end of abstention. The first section of this Chapter analyzes the emergence of the Provisional in 
the context of the Civil Rights movement and defines the agenda of the Provisional as the 
legitimate embodiment of the IRM. The IRM under Goulding and MacGiolla was incapable of 
responding to the deteriorating situation in the North due to the re-organization of the movement 
described in Chapter One. An internal struggle within the movement finally led to a split in 1969 
and the newly established Provisional emerged with a direction and an agenda that came to 
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define and shape both the Provisional struggle and the IRM as a whole. In the second section of 
Chapter Two, a progression of events that had a significant impact on the IRM are identified and 
described. The Chapter connects four events that were consequential for the self-concepts of the 
IRM: the 1970 Lower Falls Curfew; the 1972 ceasefire; the 1975 ceasefire; and, the 1981 Hunger 
Strikes. Following a detailed description of each event, their ramifications for the self-concepts 
of the IRM are analysed in terms of how new developments forced them to re-imagine their past 
and current activities. 
 
1969: Emergence of the Provisional 
 Rooted in Northern Ireland, the Civil Rights Movement was the catalyst to the outbreak 
of the Troubles in 1969 and is critical to understanding the emergence of the Provisional as well 
as its initial agenda. This section begins with a historical overview of the Civil Rights Movement 
and demonstrates the political and social context in which the Provisional were established.  
 The Civil Rights movement began to organize in Northern Ireland during the mid-1960s, 
at which time the Campaign for Social Justice (1964) and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (1967) were established (Cunningham 17). Both of these organizations were pushing 
for reform of: “the restricted local government franchise, gerrymandered local government 
electoral boundaries, the inequitable allocation of public-sector housing and discrimination in the 
provisions of public-sector employment” (Cunningham 17). All of these issues can be linked to 
the fact that prior to partition the local councils were elected under the system of proportional 
representation; following the implementation of partition, proportional representation was 
replaced with a first fast the post system which  played an inextricable part in the systematic 
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discrimination of Catholics
32
. First, business and property votes
33
 still counted in local elections. 
This is important because the majority of business and property belonged to Protestants (Coogan 
34). Second, the general vote was restricted to the occupier of a single house and his wife, but 
any tenants, servants or children over twenty-one were excluded from the local franchise 
(Coogan 34). In this case, the issue is that the allocation of public authority housing was 
controlled by the unionist-ruled local council, and openly favoured Protestant tenants to the 
social and political detriment of Catholics (Coogan 34-5). Combined with the practice of 
gerrymandering, wherein electoral wards were drawn in a way that produced an artificial 
unionist majority, the unionists were able to control the local councils, the allocation of housing 
and municipal jobs, and therefore, the outcome of the vote (Coogan 33-4). The Civil Rights 
Movement thus accused the British of not fulfilling their duty to uphold UK standards in all of 
their dominions and demanded reforms that ensured the representation of Catholic interests in 
government
34
.  
                                                          
32
 Catholics in Northern Ireland are historically aligned with nationalism and/or republicanism which supported the 
withdrawal of the British from all of Ireland’s affairs and the reunification of Northern Ireland with the Republic of 
Ireland. Protestants are historically aligned with unionism which supported the union of Northern Ireland and 
Britain. 
33
 In local government elections in Northern Ireland, only those who paid local taxes (or rates) were granted the 
right to vote. The property vote was denied to lodgers, subtenants and servants of rateable premises. In addition, 
some business and universities were granted multiple votes. 
34
 Governance in Northern Ireland was a marked departure from British practice in other parts of the UK. For 
example, the franchise had been extended to almost all adult citizens in Britain by 1950. By that time the British 
had also eliminated mostly all plural voting for Westminster as well as local government elections.  It is important 
to note that the continued lack of attention to Northern Ireland on the part of the British was historical in nature, 
and thus, difficult to overcome even in the face of a mounting civil rights crisis. In 1920, Section 75 of the 
Government of Ireland Act “reserved the sovereign right of Westminster to legislate on any matter” in Northern 
Ireland. Importantly though, Section 75 did not provide any machinery for parliamentary or executive scrutiny of 
Northern Irish affairs (Cunningham 2). Making the situation even more volatile given the divisions in the North, 
Stormont was given full responsibility over electoral arrangements, law, order and internal security (Cunningham 
3). When discriminatory and corrupt practices began to evolve, the British made it an official policy not to become 
embroiled in the affairs of Northern Ireland (Cunningham 6-7; Coogan 38-9). As early as 1922 it was established 
that areas under the responsibility of Stormont could not be discussed in the British parliament, and this 
convention was upheld until 1969 (Cunningham 9). Even the renewed pressure coming from the Civil Rights 
Movement did not change the formal position of Westminster and, instead of becoming directly involved, the 
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 Unionists in Northern Ireland were united on upholding the union with Britain and 
maintaining the border between North Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Civil Rights 
Movement that appealed for the political and social rights of Catholics was regarded as a threat 
to the power and dominance of the unionist minority. Protestants viewed any concessions made 
to the Civil Rights movement as “recognition of the legitimacy of Catholicism and the 
resurgence of nationalist irredentism” (Cunningham 18). For this reason, when the Prime 
Minister of Northern Ireland, Terrence O’Neill, pushed for reforms in Stormont that attempted to 
reduce the “autonomy and power of local government, which was an important power base for 
elements of unionism”, the Protestant population took their frustrations to the street 
(Cunningham 18). The opponents of reform countered Civil Rights marches with violence 
against the participants, and the streets of Belfast and Derry frequently became the stage for 
fierce rioting wherein Catholics and Protestants fought each other and the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) played a significant role in colluding with unionist mobs. As sectarian 
violence increased, the inability of Stormont to control the situation became apparent. Finally, on 
August 14, 1969 during the Battle of the Bogside in Derry, British troops were sent in at the 
request of the Unionist Party in Stormont.  
 While Catholics were blaming the IRM for not fulfilling its traditional role as the 
defenders of nationalists and “the letters IRA went up on the gable walls as: Irish Ran Away and 
I Ran Away” (Coogan 498), the IRM leadership in Dublin, under Cathal Goulding (IRA Chief of 
Staff) and Tomas MacGiolla (President of Sinn Fein), concerned itself with pursuing a political 
agenda that was focused on ending abstention, and that threatened to cause another major split in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
British adopted a policy of pushing any reforms through the Stormont Prime Minister (Cunningham 16-7). This lack 
of oversight had allowed the Unionist Party, the Party representing the Protestant population and their political 
interests, to govern Northern Ireland virtually unchecked since the creation of Northern Ireland.  
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the IRM. At an extraordinary IRA Convention in December 1969, Goulding agreed to lift the 
restraints on abstention. At the same time, Ruairi O’Bradaigh, Sean MacStiofain, Daithi 
O’Conaill, Seamus Twomey, Billy McKee, Joe Cahill, Jimmy Steele, John Kelly and other 
hardline IRM members set up the Provisional IRA Army Council in Belfast (Coogan 499). When 
MacGiolla received a simple majority for ending abstention at the January 1970 Sinn Fein ard 
fheis, the opponents of the MacGiolla-Goulding leadership walked out of the venue and 
established the Provisional Sinn Fein. The new president of Sinn Fein, O’Bradaigh, issued a 
statement declaring that the split occurred due to five primary conflicts, of which two are 
important for the purposes of this paper: the issue of ending abstention and the failure to protect 
northern nationalists. The Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein as the true embodiment of the IRM 
were steadfast in their commitment to abstention and to the establishment of a Republic based on 
the ideals of 1916. These commitments, and the strategies for achieving their goals, influenced 
the activities of the Provisional throughout the Troubles. 
 By late 1970, the Provisional began working on re-establishing the legitimacy of the IRM 
that had been so damaged in the North by the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership. In September 
1970, the first general Provisional IRA convention was held to elect a new leadership and to 
discuss strategy. The convention ended with the election of McKee, MacStiofain, O’Bradaigh, 
O’Conaill and Cahill to the Army Council (White 161). Militarily, the Provisional IRA strategy 
consisted of two goals; first, pooling the movement’s resources to establish a defensive force in 
order to protect Catholics in the North and second, to move to a defense and retaliation strategy 
that would force British withdrawal from Northern Ireland (Smith 94-5). On October 24-25, the 
annual Sinn Fein ard fheis saw O’Bradaigh elected unopposed as President of Provisional Sinn 
Fein (White 161). Sinn Fein called for a Democratic Socialist Republic based on the 
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Proclamation of 1916, and O’Bradaigh and O’Conaill went to work for the next two years to 
create an economic and social program for a united Ireland “with safeguards for the integrity and 
culture of the Protestant and unionist community” (White 165). Of course, the role of Sinn Fein 
would be of secondary importance in the IRM until British withdrawal and unification were 
secured by the military arm of the movement. Sinn Fein was therefore restricted to providing 
leadership to the civil resistance campaign and fighting the propaganda war for the IRM. The 
next section of this Chapter discusses the Lower Falls Curfew that occurred in June of 1970 and 
focuses on how the actions of the Provisional during this event confirmed them in their role as 
the protectors of Catholics in the North, the harbingers of Irish unity based on the ideals of the 
Republic of 1916 and, therefore, the true embodiment of the IRM.  
The 1970 Lower Falls Curfew 
 By June of 1970, most people concerned with the condition of Northern Ireland 
recognized the threat posed by the upcoming Orange parades (Warner 5). The Orange parades 
are a series of annual Protestant parades that commemorate the victory of the Protestant King 
William of Orange over the Catholic King James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Although 
the newly elected Conservative government in Westminster had considered banning this 
“traditional and provocative practice of routing marches and demonstrations by one contending 
party through the territory of the other”, its inquest into the situation led it to conclude that 
“Orangemen felt passionately about these parades and that if they were cancelled this would be 
regarded as a victory for the republican cause” (Warner 5). Inevitably, over the weekend of June 
27-28 the first major disturbances over the Orange parades arose when two parades moved 
through Ballymurphy and Ardoyne, both Catholic areas (Warner 7-8). When the Provisional IRA 
shot and killed three Orange gunmen during riots in Ardoyne, loyalists reacted by attempting to 
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burn down St. Matthew’s Church in the Short Strand, a Catholic enclave (Coogan 546). A small 
IRA unit led by McKee and Cahill defended the church and after a five hour gun battle, drove 
the loyalist mob into retreat.  
 The following week, the British Army received a tip about an arms cache on Balkan 
Street in Catholic territory and took the opportunity to address the hostile unionist reaction to the 
Army’s handling of the events over the previous weekend (Warner 8). On Friday July 3, 
munitions were found at Balkan Street.  As the search ended and the Army tried to leave the area 
fierce rioting broke out. By 10 p.m. a curfew was announced and approximately 3,000 British 
troops were sent in to the Lower Falls Road. Gradually, the Army occupied and cordoned off the 
entire area and the inhabitants were confined to their homes by military order (Warner 3). During 
the curfew, the British Army conducted a rough search for weapons: “doors were kicked in, 
furniture smashed, floorboards pulled up, wall plaster ripped off, holy pictures stamped 
underfoot or thrust down lavatories”. The Army used tear gas and opened fire on civilians as 
well as members of the IRM (Coogan 129). On July 5, 1970, the curfew was finally lifted. A few 
days later, the Army took two unionist ministers on a drive through the area to display the 
“cowed and pacified” area in an attempt to prove that their appeals had been heard and the Army 
was tough on Catholics (Coogan 548).  
The Falls Curfew had two important consequences for the Provisional: it increased the 
support they had lost among Catholics in the North, providing them a base of public support; 
and, relatedly, it legitimised their role as the true representation of the IRM. To the first point, as 
this Chapter has already discussed, the leaders of the Provisional were well aware that Catholics 
in the North had turned their back on the IRM. In order to initiate its military strategy of defense 
and retaliation against the British it required a public base of support that it was severely lacking 
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as a consequence of the previous years’ events. The IRM needed to demonstrate its commitment 
to the northern nationalists, and it needed to do so militarily. Both McKee and Cahill’s defense 
of St. Matthews and the Provisionals’ role in the Lower Falls Curfew helped to change the “I 
Ran Away” reputation and allowed them to reclaim their role as the harbingers of Irish 
unification. As O’Bradaigh put it: “If it had planned it, the British Army could not have done a 
better job of alienating the nationalist community in Belfast; it made IRA recruiting…that much 
easier” (White 159). This distrust of the Army combined with an invigorated IRM that used 
military might as the primary means for achieving their goals bred an environment conducive to 
raising support and recruitment. Barricades began to proliferate in Catholic neighborhoods to 
create “no-go” areas; security forces allowed the barricades to stay in place and did not operate 
behind them (Smith 92). It was in the no-go areas that the IRM worked to recruit members and 
bolster the propaganda war, eventually controlling entire neighbourhoods. As their support grew 
the transition from defense to a defense and retaliation strategy began and, more importantly, 
legitimacy of the Provisional as the embodiment of the IRM increased.   
 Secondly, in addition to re-claiming the role as the primary group fighting for British 
withdrawal and Irish unification, the Lower Falls Curfew provided the Provisional with the 
opportunity to claim legitimacy as the true representatives of the IRM. In his Presidential address 
at the October 1970 Sinn Fein ard fheis, O’Bradaigh made a speech demonstrating that “They 
were not new. They were Sinn Fein” (White 162). O’Bradaigh went so far as to ask the media to 
acknowledge his organization as the “true and official Sinn Fein”, and stated that “because they 
were Sinn Fein, there were no changes in party policy to announce” (White 163). This was 
O’Bradaigh’s plea to ensure that the symbols, myths and narratives of the IRM were associated 
with the Provisional. Furthermore, the “political program” of Provisional Sinn Fein demonstrated 
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no more enthusiasm for electoral politics than any traditional Sinn Fein—the program assumed 
that the Provisional IRA would defeat the British militarily and force a withdrawal, at which time 
the leadership of the IRM would establish a new government based on the Republic of 1916. In 
this case, the need to end abstention or contemplate electoral politics was not even a question. 
Regardless of their early preoccupation with securing their role as the principal group still 
fighting for the Republic of 1916 and, therefore, the only true representation of the IRM, the 
actions of the Provisional
35
  over the next few years would propel them to that role, beginning 
with the events of the 1972 ceasefire. 
The 1972 Ceasefire  
 The time leading up to the 1972 ceasefire brought an increasingly unstable situation in 
Northern Ireland. The IRM officially announced its offensive campaign in October 1971 and 
began to engage in systematic bombing of commercial targets such as shops and businesses
36
 
(Smith 95). The violent campaign of the IRM was paralleled by a rise in unionist paramilitary 
activities, and the security situation in the North was sliding into anarchy. This was largely the 
result of the state being run by both Stormont and Britain, leading to a paralysis of decision 
making (Coogan 550). Although the British did not become directly involved in the affairs of 
Northern Ireland as per their policy since 1922, they pushed reforms through Stormont Prime 
Minster James Chichester-Clark (who succeeded O’Neill). Chichester-Clark attempted to do 
Britain’s bidding by pushing through reforms meant to appease the Catholic population. 
However, he was opposed by hardline unionists within his own party and “while genuine efforts 
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 The Provisional as a whole (I.e. both Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Fein) will henceforth referred to as the 
IRM. 
36
 As most businesses were owned by Protestants by default most of these bombings involved Protestant shops 
and businesses. However bombs were not intended to target civilians but to attack the economic structure of 
Northern Ireland and contribute to creating instability eventually making Northern Ireland ungovernable.  
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were made, the delays meant that events on the ground overtook them, losing impact on 
Catholics and enraging unionists” (Coogan 550). Finally, on March 22 1972, Stormont was 
suspended and Britain began direct rule in Northern Ireland. The British were now faced with the 
reality that they were engaged in direct war with the IRM.  
At this time, the new British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, 
began a series of discussions aimed at conceding safe conduct to the leaders of the IRM
37
 to 
come to London and meet with him (Coogan 172-3). The IRM demanded two concessions 
before meeting with Whitelaw: first, they demanded political status, or Special Category 
Status
38
, for the prisoners who were then on hunger strike at Crumlin Road jail; and second, they 
wanted Gerry Adams
39
 to be released from Long Kesh prison for the talks (Coogan 173). On 
June 29, 1972, the IRM began a ceasefire, and on July 7 1972 a delegation including 
MacStiofain, Twomey, O’Conaill, Adams, and Martin McGuinness travelled to London to 
negotiate with Whitelaw (Coogan 173-4). For its part, the IRM had five demands: first, a public 
declaration that Britain was, for the whole people of Ireland, acting and voting as a unit to decide 
the future of Ireland
40
; second, the British government would have to give an immediate 
declaration of its intent to withdraw from Irish soil, the withdrawal to be completed before 
January 1 1975; third, British troops would have to be withdrawn immediately from sensitive 
areas; fourth, a general amnesty for all political prisoners in Irish prisons had to be provided, as 
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 It was the Provisional IRA and not Provisional Sinn Fein that were invited to the talks as the British recognized 
that it was the IRA element of the republican movement conducting the war.   
38
 Special Category Status gave IRM prisoners political status, rather than criminal status. This meant they had 
special privileges: the right to not do prison work, the right to wear their own clothing, the right to free 
association, and the right to extra visits and parcels (expansive overview on page 47-48).  
39
 A young and influential republican in Belfast, Adams was viewed as a potential leader for the entire movement, 
and thus his presence was paramount in these negotiations. 
40
 The goal of the Provisional was to secure British withdrawal and unify Northern Ireland with the Republic of 
Ireland. A declaration from the British that referenced the whole people of Ireland rather than just Northern 
Ireland symbolized that the British supported the end of partition upon their withdrawal from Irish affairs. 
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well as for all internees, detainees and persons on the wanted list; and fifth, the British Army 
would suspend offensive operations and call an immediate end to internment. Unfortunately, 
Whitelaw could not offer this degree of reform; the British had a constitutional obligation to 
Northern Ireland that could not simply be broken in the way the IRM leaders were suggesting 
(Coogan 567). Following the resulting breakdown of the ceasefire just two days later, the IRM 
intensified its campaign. 
  The first significant outcome of the 1972 ceasefire in terms of the IRM’s self-concepts 
was that it demonstrated the ability of the movement to use military means to force the British to 
the negotiating table. The IRM had already moved from a defensive position to one of defense 
and retaliation, whereby they engaged in the systematic bombing of commercial targets. The 
logic behind this strategy was that given the disparity in resources between the British Army and 
the IRM, a limited form of war aimed at making Northern Ireland ungovernable would 
eventually force Britain to negotiate on the IRM’s terms (Smith 95-6). Because it demonstrated 
the inability of the Unionist Party to continue governing Northern Ireland, the fall of Stormont 
and the implementation of direct rule was one indication that this strategy had worked; being 
granted Special Category Status was another. The final evidence that the Provisional’s strategy 
was successful was Whitelaw’s invitation to negotiate. This reinforced the notion that the armed 
struggle was the only means through which victory would be attained. This demonstrates how 
hardline and traditional the IRM was at this time. However, the lack of progress made in the 
negotiation revealed the weakness of a purely military approach to ousting the British from 
Northern Ireland, which this section discusses next.  
 The second effect of the 1972 ceasefire was the emergent realization that some form of a 
political strategy might have to be expanded to accomplish the goals of the IRM. While the 
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Whitelaw talks proved that the military strategy had worked, the inability to obtain any of their 
demands undermined the IRM’s role as the harbingers of British withdrawal from the North and 
Irish unification in the spirit of the Republic of 1916. At this time, the IRM consisted mostly of 
hardline militarists; they viewed their struggle as a military one and a political program would 
only be important after the British conceded to their demands
41
. From the perspective of the IRM 
leadership, the armed struggle was what brought them to the negotiating table in 1972, not 
formal political action. For this reason, the very act of the British sitting down at the conference 
table was considered surrendering. Therefore, the IRM offered no room for negotiating beyond 
British withdrawal and the creation of a united Ireland (Smith 105). This has everything to do 
with the fact that the IRM placed themselves within the tradition of military action and thus were 
“conditioned to respond to the status quo in a pre-determined way” (Smith 105). To the IRM 
leadership, any compromise would be a betrayal of the Proclamation of 1916 and, as 
MacStiofain stated, “concessions be damned, we want our freedom” (Smith 106). As such, the 
perceived success brought by Whitelaw’s invitation was undermined by the inability to gain any 
ground on their demands, and the disconnect between militarism and politics within the 
movement became evident.  
 The final effect of the 1972 ceasefire it legitimized the IRM’s cause through the granting 
of Special Category Status. The concession of Special Category Status meant that all those 
imprisoned as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland would be granted political status: they 
did not have to wear prison clothes or do prison work; they were housed together in their 
paramilitary factions, allowed the right of free association and to organise educational and 
recreational pursuits; and, they were allowed one visit, one parcel and one letter per week. First, 
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 This is why O’Bradaigh’s Eire Nua and Eire Nua II discussed political plans for a post-British, united Ireland; the 
assumption was that the IRA would secure those goals and a political programme would follow. 
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the granting of Special Category Status as a precursor to negotiations reaffirmed the IRM belief 
that their strategy was successful and the British were willing to concede to their demands. This 
was a major contributing factor to Whitelaw immediately coming to see the concession as a 
mistake (Coogan 173). Second, the IRM believed that with political prisoner status the war 
against the British was legitimized in the eyes of both Irish Catholics and the rest of the world. 
Under political status IRM members were not considered criminals but prisoners of war, and this 
legitimized the measures taken in the war against the British by undermining any allegations that 
they were simply terrorists representing the views of a small minority. Lastly, Special Category 
Status would have enormous consequences in the future events of the Troubles—particularly 
when the British moved to eliminate the privilege in 1976. This decision came on the heels of the 
demoralizing 1975 ceasefire, which is the next event this Chapter will discuss. 
 
The 1975 Ceasefire 
 One of the more positive lasting effects of the 1972 ceasefire was the fact that the lines of 
communication had remained open (if only minimally) since the negotiations with Whitelaw. 
This would eventually lead to another ceasefire in 1975. The clergy provided an informal line of 
communication between the IRM and the British government, leading to a ceasefire on February 
10 1975. The IRM declared the ceasefire in return for the phasing out of internment, the 
reduction of the British army presence in Catholic areas and the establishment of “incident 
centres staffed by members of Provisional Sinn Fein…to monitor the truce and liaise with the 
Northern Ireland Office” (Smith 129). The IRM again entered negotiations taking a hard line, 
demanding that… 
[the] people of Ireland elect a constituent assembly that would draft an 
all-Ireland constitution with a ‘provincial parliament for Ulster (nine 
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counties) with meaningful powers’, a public commitment from the 
British that they would withdraw within twelve months of the adoption of 
the constitution, and amnesty for all political prisoners and for those 
[IRM members] on the wanted list (White 223).  
 
Although the IRM realized that the British could not concede these demands publicly, as they 
were made before the announcement of the truce, they expected to make significant progress in 
these negotiations in comparison to those of 1972. The IRM leadership was ideologically 
committed to British withdrawal as the minimum concession for an end to the war: just as during 
the previous negotiations, the IRM was unable to form a political strategy and they demonstrated 
once again “the movement’s inability to cope with a period of peace” (Smith 129). It became 
clear very early that the ceasefire would not yield benefits for either side. The ceasefire officially 
ended in January 1976 because, as in 1972, no progress was made. However, unlike 1972, this 
ceasefire was demoralising for the IRM and led to a significant change in British policy in 
Northern Ireland, which this Chapter discusses next.  
 The dramatic shift in British policies in Northern Ireland following the breakdown of the 
1975 ceasefire had an influence on the IRM. The British embarked on two policies that were 
aimed at undermining the capacity of the IRM to continue with its campaign: criminalization and 
ulsterization. Criminalization was most closely associated with the ending of Special Category 
Status for IRM prisoners. By March 1976 Special Category Status had been withdrawn.  Because 
it delegitimized the nature of the struggle by denying political prisoner status for IRM prisoners 
so they were no longer viewed as prisoners of a legitimate war, this represented a major blow for 
the identity of republicans. The main purpose of criminalization was to portray and treat 
members of the IRM as ordinary criminals rather than as a Special Category group (Coogan, 
583). The plan was to “characterise the [IRM] as a small, unrepresentative group defying the will 
of the majority of the population” whose actions would now be classed as criminal and who 
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would be sentenced as criminal (Feeney 278). Of course, this portrayal ran contrary to the 
fundamental IRM belief that it was “legitimate to use force to oppose the presence of British rule 
in Ireland and therefore that those engaged in using force are patriots and freedom-fighters” 
(Feeney 277). The second element of the new British policy in Northern Ireland was known as 
ulsterization and involved a reduction in the role of the British Army and increasingly devolving 
powers to the police and security forces that already existed in Northern Ireland. The strategy 
behind ulsterization was to reinforce the image that the violence in Northern Ireland was an 
internal conflict; it intended to work against the IRM plan “to embroil the British government in 
as direct a manner as possible in order to represent the conflict as a struggle for national 
liberation against an imperial oppressor” (Smith 144). While the new policy direction aimed at 
delegitimizing the military struggle, the IRM was attempting to adapt to a changing situation. 
 The most important impact of the 1975 ceasefire was the internal changes that began 
following the breakdown of negotiations, specifically, the emergence of Adams as a powerful 
force in the IRM. While the ceasefire yielded some important results, such as the phasing out of 
internment and the creation of incident centers manned by Sinn Fein activists (Coogan 578), the 
second failed attempt at negotiating a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland coupled with an 
unnecessarily long and ineffective ceasefire
42
 had the effect of demoralising the IRM and the 
communities that it served. The IRM was forced to acknowledge that there would be no 
immediate British withdrawal and ceasefires were far from bringing any peace. Some IRM 
members began to promulgate the doctrine that they were in for a “Long War” if they were 
unable to develop a political strategy (White 258-9). One of the most outspoken supporters of 
politicization would soon emerge as a leader of the movement: Adams. Adams wrote a series of 
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 The ceasefire lasted nearly an entire year before it was called off and no progress was made in terms of securing 
a British withdrawal from Ireland.  
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articles that were both critical of the direction taken by the leadership during the ceasefire, and 
also argued for greater politicization of the IRM. Adams addressed “underlying questions 
regarding the nature and relevance of [the IRM’s] political beliefs and practice” (Adams 248). 
He argued that “there was a need for republicans not only to spell out their vision but to actively 
involve themselves in local issues which affected day-to-day life in the community” (Smith 147). 
Without a connection to their local communities, Adams argued the IRM “lacked the necessary 
political consciousness to exploit the momentum created by the military campaign” (Smith 146). 
In summary, Adams was calling for politicization of the movement, and as a young northern 
IRM member he was not alone. Adams and his like-minded comrades slowly gained influence in 
IRM and, after 1975, began a process of politicization that would ultimately gain credence 
through the Hunger Strikes in the early 1980s. 
The 1981 Hunger Strikes  
 As previously discussed, Special Category Status was central to the legitimacy of the 
IRM. The Hunger Strikes that developed as result of its abolishment created a swell of public 
support for the IRM’s cause and helped to push the agenda of Adams and his supporters to a 
place they could not otherwise have gone. Led by Bobby Sands, ten IRM prisoners began a 
Hunger Strike on March 1, 1981
43
. The British Prime Minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, 
took the position that the strikers were common criminals, and her attitude was nothing short of 
hostile. Thatcher proved unmoved by international gestures of solidarity as well as high-level 
appeals for compromise (e.g. the Pope, other senior church figures, Irish MPs), which resulted in 
both sympathy and support for the cause of the prisoners in Northern Ireland, the Republic of 
Ireland and around the world.  
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The first opportunity to exploit the support generated by the Hunger Strikes for political 
purposes arose when, on March 6 1981, the Fermanagh-Tyrone South (Northern Ireland) MP 
died. Some IRM members saw the election that was to follow as an opportunity to transform 
sympathies for their cause into political support for convicted IRM prisoners. However, the 
O’Bradaigh/O'Conaill leadership in Dublin was still fervently against participating in elections. 
It was eventually decided that Sands would run for the seat, supported by the party but not as an 
official Sinn Fein candidate. The rationale behind this strategy was that by throwing their weight 
behind the Hunger Strikers, they could gauge how well IRM members performed without any 
risk to the self-concepts of the IRM: “If they did well, Sinn Fein could claim its candidates 
would have done better. If they did badly, well then it was because they were not real Sinn Fein 
candidates” (Feeney 300). Furthermore, prisoners were naturally abstentionist in that they would 
be unable to take their seats in parliament, which made supporting them justifiable.  
 The electoral victories that followed this decision would legitimize the push for further 
politicization of the movement by demonstrating that an electoral strategy would not 
compromise the armed struggle. Amidst the continuation of the armed struggle, Sands won the 
by-election on April 9, 1981. In addition to this victory, on August 20, in the by-election created 
by Sands’ death, his election agent Owen Carron won even more votes than Sands had. Thirty-
six electoral victories followed and to the northerners this was evidence that the “armed struggle 
did not limit Sinn Fein’s appeal to a nationalist electorate” (Feeney 291). Building on the 
electoral victories across Northern Ireland, the IRM decided they would throw their weight 
behind two more convicted IRM prisoners, but this time, in the Republic of Ireland itself. On 
June 11, 1981, Kieran Doherty (one of the IRM prisoners who ultimately died on Hunger Strike) 
and Paddy Agnew (an IRM prisoner) were elected to Leinster House. In October 1981 the 
 
 
51 
Hunger Strike was called off, and the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, 
subsequently conceded to the prisoners’ demands: the right not to wear a prisoner uniform; the 
right not to do prison work; the right of free association with other prisoners and to organise 
educational and recreational pursuits; the right to one visit, one letter and one parcel per week; 
and, full restoration of remission
44
 lost through the protest. The successful experiment with 
politics while in the midst of a twelve-year armed struggle with the British encouraged Adams’ 
and his supporters to officially contest elections as Sinn Fein. However, they would still have to 
convince the hardliners in the IRM that they could be both the true representatives of the IRM 
and participate in electoral politics. 
 The Hunger Strikes in 1981 ignited a tidal wave of support for the IRM, both amongst the 
communities that it represented in Northern Ireland and, as evidenced by the elections of Agnew 
and Doherty, in the Republic of Ireland. However, the way in which to proceed was viewed 
differently by the two factions now existent within the IRM: the older leadership, under 
O’Bradaigh and O’Conaill, and Adams and his supporters. For the former, the end of the Hunger 
Strikes meant an opportunity to return to the military struggle. Although the campaign had 
continued throughout the Hunger Strikes, the prisoners had hijacked the IRM and much of its 
resources had been directed toward supporting them (Feeney 293). On the other hand, Adams 
and his supporters wished to direct the momentum created by the Hunger Strikes toward further 
political activities, which would require allowing Sinn Fein candidates to contest elections
45
. 
Rather than suggest that the movements’ resources be concentrated on this goal, Adams realized 
he had to make a case for electoral politics that complemented the armed campaign.  
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 To this end, the Armalite and Ballot Box Strategy was announced at the October 1981 
Sinn Fein ard fheis. The goal of the IRM was still to force British withdrawal and secure a united 
Ireland, but the way in which this would be achieved would change. The British under Thatcher 
still believed the solution to Northern Ireland was to defeat the IRM, and “since [Sinn Fein] 
supported the IRA’s analysis of the Irish problem, that meant Sinn Fein essentially agreed…that 
the problem was a military one” (Feeney 302). The solution for Sinn Fein 
was to be able to show that a substantial percentage of the Irish people, 
North and South, supported the republican position that the British 
should leave and furthermore that the IRA was right to pursue armed 
struggle against the British Army to force it to leave. If the IRA could 
show that Sinn Fein had widespread electoral support, then the IRA could 
claim the electoral support was for the IRA’s policy. The military 
campaign would be endorsed by the people” (Feeney 303).  
 
 
It was only because of the electoral victories of the prisoners during the Hunger Strikes 
that Adams was able to push this strategy. The Armalite and Ballot Box Strategy legitimized the 
enlargement of a political programme and for the most part, quelled the anxieties and frustrations 
of traditionalist IRM members. For their part, the southern-based leadership were “taken aback 
by the speed and apparent lack of concern for the consequences with which electoralism was 
embraced” (Feeney 305). However, the decisions were now being driven largely by those 
following Adams in the North, and they had their sights set on running Sinn Fein candidates in 
the both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
 While electoral support for the IRM under the banner of Sinn Fein remained relatively 
stable in Northern Ireland, without the emotionally-charged environment of the Hunger Strike 
the IRM had lost political influence in the Republic of Ireland. In the February 1982 Republic of 
Ireland election, the IRM ran Sinn Fein ran candidates in constituencies where Hunger Strike 
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candidates had stood the previous year. The goal of this strategy was to garner the same support 
that had been shown during the Hunger Strikes, but for Sinn Fein specifically. However, Sinn 
Fein polled less than half of the votes the prisoners had received during the previous year 
(Feeney 306). It became obvious to Adams that without the highly emotional environment of a 
hunger strike there was no taste for abstentionist candidates in the Republic of Ireland. The role 
of Sinn Fein would require rethinking to accommodate the reality that, in contrast to the 
communities in Northern Ireland, the citizens of the Republic of Ireland accepted the government 
institutions that had been in place since 1922 as legitimate. By the end of 1982, the impetus for 
ending abstention was settled. 
1986: Ending Abstention 
 In order to once again turn the IRM into a national movement (i.e., have the same 
electoral success in the Republic of Ireland as in the North), abstention had to be terminated. The 
groundwork was laid at the 1982 Sinn Fein ard fheis where Adams and his supporters 
accomplished two goals: first, O’Bradaigh resigned and Adams began his ascent to the Sinn Fein 
presidency; and second, the Sinn Fein constitution was ratified to allow previously banned 
discussion about abstention. Electoral success in 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985 at the local 
government, regional assembly,Westminster and European levels legitimized the claim that the 
Armalite and Ballot Box strategy was still working. At the 1985 Sinn Fein ard fheis, Adams felt 
secure enough to initiate a resolution proposing the removal of the abstention clause from the 
Sinn Fein constitution and officially enlarge the role of politics in the IRM. Although the motion 
did not pass, the leadership, now officially under Adams, was able to observe the extent of the 
opposition and how to deal with it at the next ard fheis. At the 1986 Sinn Fein ard fheis, the Sinn 
Fein resolution to end abstention passes with the two-thirds majority required. O’Bradaigh led 
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twenty of his supporters out of the meeting, effectively ending their membership in the IRM. A 
speech by McGuinness confirmed that the IRM was ending abstention to gain electoral support 
in the Republic of Ireland. Furthermore, McGuinness rejected any suggestion that entering 
Leinster House would mean an end to the IRM’s unapologetic support for the right of the Irish 
people to oppose Britain through the use of arms. Together, Adams and McGuinness were able 
to expand the political involvement of the IRM without causing a split in the movement. 
 
Conclusion 
 Chapter Two has provided a narrative for understanding the impact that the Troubles had 
on the IRM’s self-concepts regarding their role in Ireland. The IRM that emerged from the 
Lower Falls Curfew as principal group fighting for Irish unification was steadfast in its belief 
that the use of arms could achieve British defeat and unite Ireland in the spirit of the Republic of 
1916. The 1972 and 1975 ceasefires provided opportunities for this goal to be realized—the 
military strategy of the IRM through the IRA, bolstered by the propaganda and community work 
of Sinn Fein, had brought the British to the negotiating table. The inability of the IRM’s 
leadership to negotiate as a result of their hardline mentality sent the conflict into an even worse 
state, wherein the British introduced the criminalization and ulsterization policies. Disillusioned 
by the inability of the Dublin leadership to capitalize on the momentum created by the military 
strategy, young IRM members such as Adams sought to enhance the political consciousness of 
the movement. Adams began working toward expanding the role of politics, and Sinn Fein, in 
the IRM strategy. The first opportunity in which to set this plan in motion came through the 
Hunger Strikes. The IRM was able capitalize on the support from the communities that it had 
sworn to protect and international sympathies by electing IRM prisoners. It was these successes 
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that allowed Adams and McGuinness to push the Armalite and Ballot Box Strategy in 1981. This 
Strategy proved to hardline traditionalists that a political program could exist alongside the 
armed struggle, and paved the way for completely abolishing the abstention policy in 1986.  
 As this Chapter has demonstrated, the transformation of the IRM was influenced by the 
period in which it took place. This thesis posits that at these four crucial moments during the 
Troubles, the IRM self-concepts were challenged, and the end result of these challenges was to 
change the movement’s strategy by expanding their political role in the form of ending 
abstention. The assumption that the IRM was acting to protect their identity needs is tied to the 
theoretical framework employed by this thesis. From an ontological security perspective, 
behaviour and interests are motivated by the need to maintain a consistent self-identity. When 
actors’ social actions no longer reflect how they see themselves, they will alter their behaviour. 
In the case of the IRM, the armed struggle was unable to produce any significant results in terms 
of British withdrawal and ending partition. Therefore, in order to fulfill their role as the 
harbingers of sovereignty, the IRM was required to change tactics and accept political avenues as 
a possible means to achieving their goals. This required a concomitant change in the way the 
IRM outwardly legitimized their actions. Chapter Three will discuss ontological security in 
greater detail and explore the theoretical tools of self-concepts and biographical narrative.  
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Chapter Three 
Introduction 
 This thesis has described the significance of the IRM’s decision to officially depart from 
what had been a central component of its strategy since the 1916 Easter Uprising: abstention. 
What is more, the abandonment of abstention was not accompanied by a major split in the ranks 
of the IRM, as it historically had been. Not only was the ending of abstention without causing 
any splits in the movement an anomaly in its seventy-year history, but the fact that this 
institutional change took place during a crucial period of time begs the questions ‘how’ and 
‘why’. This thesis explores the degree to which the context of this landmark decision—
specifically, in the midst of a seventeen year war with the British—played a role in the 
accomplishment of such a major transformation in the IRM’s strategy. A theoretical approach 
that treats identity as a central component of a group’s actions helps to make sense of this 
decision and assists in answering the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of this change. Taking an ontological 
security approach, this thesis demonstrates that identity can be operationalised in these terms. 
From an ontological security perspective it can be argued that an actor’s need to maintain 
resonance between their self-concepts and their biographical narrative motivated the behaviour 
of the IRM throughout the Troubles. By 1986, the abstention policy no longer resonated with the 
IRM’s self-concepts and the goals of their biographical narrative and was therefore abandoned in 
favour of formal participation in politics.  
 
Understanding Ontological Security  
 Ontological security is rooted in the constructivist school which argues that the structure 
of the international system consists of shared ideas and that it is these ideas that shape actors’ 
behaviour and interests (Brown 51-2; Wendt 18). Constructivists contend that because interests 
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and behaviour are influenced by ideational as well as material forces, perceptions of threat and 
opportunity are subjective rather than a result of narrowly defined self-interest; a characteristic of 
the rational actor model which argues that actors are foremost concerned with securing their own 
physical security. This focus on an ideational concept of reality as arguably more important than 
the classic approach to analyzing human behaviour, lends itself to explaining the IRM’s 
attachment to abstention as well as why and how they ended that commitment in 1986. During 
the Troubles, members of the IRM were obviously unconcerned with their physical security and, 
as such, an explanation for their actions cannot be understood through traditional approaches.  
Ontological security on the other hand is rooted in the sense of who one is; in a world of 
shared ideas, actors’ ideas about themselves are significantly important for motivating the 
perception of interests and behaviour. The two key ideas which constitute ontological security 
are self-concepts and a biographical narrative. Self-concepts are the way in which actors see 
themselves and wish to be seen by others; the contextual roles which define appropriate 
responses to particular situations. These self-concepts form the biographical narrative; the story 
that makes self-concepts knowable and which guides behaviour. It is referred to as ontological 
‘security’ since a stable sense of self is required in order to feel agentic and take action based on 
perceptions of self. To that end, the narrative goals of an actor must align with their self-
concepts; when self-concepts no longer reflect or can no longer achieve the stated goals of the 
biographical narrative, actors feel insecure and are unable to exercise agency until they re-
establish that alignment. In the context of this thesis, various events throughout the Troubles led 
to a dissonance between the IRM’s self-concepts and therefore the overall biographical narrative 
of the movement. By applying ontological security, this thesis will demonstrate that this 
dissonance is what motivated the decision to end abstention, ultimately substantiating the claim 
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that ideas, and identity, matter. In order to build this argument, this Chapter will begin with a 
synopsis of constructivism, the larger school of thought from which ontological security was 
born.  
 Constructivism posits that social structures drive behaviour as much as, if not more than, 
narrowly defined rational calculation
46
.  While other theories rely on the causal power of rational 
self-interest for explaining behaviour, constructivism emphasizes the role of ideas and identity in 
shaping interest and behaviour by defining threats, opportunities and the appropriate response to 
each in any given context. For example, the rational choice model suggests actors will engage in 
goal-directed behaviour aimed at securing their physical and material wellbeing.  This excludes 
the identity of individual actors from analysis because behaviour is based on “what is essentially 
an ends-means calculation, in which the ‘end’ (security) is given in advance and the same for all 
actors” (Brown 53). By contrast, social constructivists argue that behavior is directed by the 
shared ideas of purposeful actors and that the interests and identities of these actors are in turn 
constructed by those shared ideas. In other words, actors both shape and are shaped by the social 
structures they are operating in. Wendt argues that “actions continually produce and reproduce 
conceptions of Self and Other” (Brown 53) meaning that identity is responsible for ascribing 
meaning to action. This is important to the argument of this thesis because the IRM continually 
engaged in action that was detrimental to their physical security; however, the routine of the 
armed struggle was a part of their identity, and therefore provided security of the ontological 
form. The IRM’s identity relied on the narrative goals as the harbingers of British withdrawal 
from Irish affairs and Irish unification.  The cultural, economic and political occupation of 
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preferences, costs and benefits. In international relations, narrowly defined self-interest is associated with 
maintaining physical security; therefore, all actions taken by an actor are a result of cost-benefit analysis with the 
intention of securing physical well-being over anything else. 
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Ireland by the British both awakened and threatened the very core of that narrative. This thesis 
demonstrates how identity generates meaning; the IRM as harbingers of Ireland’s unification was 
a central component of their biographical narrative and this was the main influencer behind their 
actions against the British.  The importance of identity needs in motivating behaviour is more 
closely related to ontological security, which is born of constructivism and which this Chapter 
will discuss next.  
 Crafted by Mitzen and Steele and based on the work of Anthony Giddens, ontological 
security builds on the work of constructivism but offers a slightly more refined theoretical 
framework for understanding how identity-needs are the primary facilitator and motivators of 
behaviour. Constructivism posits that behaviour is more often motivated by ideational and social 
factors than by physical security and material well-being. Identity matters in constructivism 
because, in a world where threats and opportunities are subjective, it serves as the primary tool 
for ascribing meaning to actions. The concept of ontological security develops this constructivist 
argument and offers more specific theoretical tools for understanding the dynamics of identity 
and its influence on behaviour. Giddens began with the assertion that in the traditional order
47
, 
behaviour and interests were predetermined in the way that rational-choice assumes. However, 
he argues in the setting of modernity, the self and the broader institutions in which it exists are 
reflexively made (Giddens 2-3). That is to say modernity has produced a social structure
48
 within 
which actors must develop a mechanism for managing all of the options in an inherently unstable 
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 In Modernity and Self-Identity, the traditional order is understood in opposition to modernity. Modernity is a 
post-traditional social order that differs from all preceding forms of order in regard to its dynamism, ability to 
undercut traditional habits and customs, and its global impact (Giddens 1-2).  
48 According to Giddens, modern institutions differ from all preceding forms of social order in regard to their 
dynamism and the degree to which they undercut traditional habits and customs, as well as their global impact: 
“modernity radically alters the nature of day-to-day social life and affects the most personal aspects of our 
experience” (Giddens, 1) 
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social environment. Giddens, Mitzen and Steele argue that identity is responsible for managing 
that plethora of options and decisions by providing meaning to external stimuli and therefore 
informing appropriate responses. Like constructivism, it is through contextually specific 
conceptions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ that options are weighed and decisions are made. For this 
reason, it is crucial to protect one’s subjective sense of self as it provides coherence to the world. 
This is the argument developed through the concept of ontological security. 
 Ontological security refers to security in a subjective sense of who one is over time.  It 
requires establishing a system of routines that work to minimize disruptions in that sense of self. 
According to Mitzen, Steele and Giddens, ontological security can be defined as “the need to 
experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time—as being rather than constantly 
changing” (Mitzen 342). Continuity between self-concepts and the actions that reinforce identity 
are key to facilitating agency: identity is viewed as the mechanism through which meaning is 
made.  As a consequence, an actor without a stable perception of ontological security is unable to 
determine which dangers to confront and which to ignore (Mitzen 345). In other words, without 
a stable sense of self, actors are unable to systematically manage the potential opportunities and 
dangers of everyday life and thus concentrate on tasks at hand. As opposed to this condition, an 
actor who is ontologically secure is able to act because their self-identity provides guidelines for 
what is appropriate behaviour. Ontological security therefore provides actors with “confident 
expectations, even if probabilistic, about the means-end relationships that govern” their life 
(Mitzen 345). In order to generate action and choice, therefore, actors become attached to 
routines that create a stable cognitive environment and provide continuity in their sense of self 
(Mitzen 346-7; Steele 3-5). Actors seek ontological security through routinizing their 
relationships with other actors and “since continued agency requires the cognitive certainty these 
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routines provide, actors get attached to these social relationships” (Mitzen 342; Steele 3). Day to 
day routines thus come to be invested with emotional significance. Disruptions to this sense of 
self causes anxiety for the individual. When routines no longer reflect or are reflected in the way 
actors see themselves, they will seek to re-establish routines that better reflect their sense of self. 
How these changes come to cause anxiety, as well as how they are legitimized for the purpose of 
decreasing the effects of disruption, is closely related to actors’ biographical narrative and self-
concepts.  
 Biographical narrative and self-concepts are two important analytical tools created by 
Giddens and developed for group interaction in international relations by both Steele and Mitzen. 
An actor’s biographical narrative is the story through which self-concepts, or how an actor sees 
themselves and how they want to be seen by others, are brought to life. Mitzen and Steele apply 
this to group identity, specifically states. They illustrate that “states ‘talk’ about their actions in 
identity terms, and this is necessary because only in the telling of the event does it acquire 
meaning, the meaning that makes such events politically relevant” (Steele 10-11). Specifically, 
these stories “link by implication a policy with a description or understanding of a state ‘self’” in 
order to “create meanings for their actions [that are] logically consistent with their identities” 
(Steele 11). By understanding a state’s biographical narrative and how this aligns with its self-
concepts, scholars can identify how identity needs place boundaries and limits on which actions 
a state is willing or able to pursue. 
 Shame
49
 is a critical aspect of ontological security and plays an important role in 
understanding why the IRM chose to end abstention when they did. An important aspect of the 
biographical narrative is that it serves as the means through which actors justify their actions in 
                                                          
49 According to Steele, “shame produces a deep feeling of insecurity – it is a temporary but radical severance of a state’s sense of Self. Its 
presence means that a state recognizes how its actions were (or could be) incongruent with its sense of self-identity” (Steele 3). 
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terms of their identity needs. According to Mitzen, actions will either reproduce or contradict 
identities, “and since identity motivates action, its stability over time depends on it being 
supported in practice” (5). Dissonance between self-concepts and narrative actions generates 
shame as there is anxiety regarding the “adequacy of the narrative by means of which the 
individual sustains a coherent biography” (Giddens 66). The presence of shame signifies that an 
actor is unable to “reconcile past (or prospective) actions with the biographical narrative” used 
“to justify their behaviour” (Steele 13). When actions no longer align with a sense of self, an 
individual cannot systematically relate ends to means and their ability to act, or their agency, is 
obstructed. For this reason, shame acts as motivating factor for changing behaviour and re-
establishing routines that better suit the self-concepts of the actor. As will be argued in Chapter 
four, ending abstention in 1986 was an example of the IRM establishing new routines as a result 
of shame. The violent behaviour of the Provisional at the outset of the Troubles was justified by 
their narrative as harbingers of a united Ireland. However, a number of critical events changed 
the context of the conflict and challenged whether that behaviour best reflected their identity.  
 The methodology most often employed with ontological security is discourse analysis. It 
is employed to understand the content of an actor’s biographical narrative but also to “reveal 
how a discourse’s effects constitute certain types of action” (Steele 11). Discourse analysis 
accomplishes three important objectives in terms of understanding the link between self-concepts 
and biographical narrative. First, it demonstrates how an actor connects a policy to their 
biographical narrative or fails to do so. Further, discourse analysis demonstrates how a policy is 
justified in terms of what it means for the actor’s sense of self-identity. Second, discourse 
analysis reveals when considerations of identity-needs lead to a specific policy choice. Finally, 
discourse analysis illuminates how actors create meanings of both their vision of self-identity 
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and also of identity threats (Steele 11). In terms of this thesis, speeches, editorials and other 
relevant documents will be used to demonstrate the shift in the self-concepts and biographical 
narrative of the IRM. Specifically, Chapter Four analyses five critical moments during the 
Troubles that challenged the self-concepts of the IRM, caused feelings of shame, and eventually 
led to a change in the self-concepts of the movement in the form of accepting a greater role for 
politics by way of ending abstention.  
 
Conclusion 
 This Chapter has provided a detailed overview of the theoretical framework employed by 
this thesis. Constructivism asserts the notion that identity matters in international politics. 
Because it acts as the lens through which generic actions are given meaning, the self-identity of 
an actor is of utmost importantce when analysing behaviour. Building on this premise, theorists 
of ontological security assert that identity is the main factor determining the behaviour of actors. 
Identity enables actors to navigate and manage a plethora of options by giving them a 
mechanism for linking ends to means. As such, actors pursue ontological security, or security in 
the subjective sense of who one is. This requires a stable cognitive environment, which is 
achieved by establishing routines with other actors and through the continuity between action 
and narrative. Shame is produced when routines or actions no longer reflect an actor’s sense of 
self. In order to correct these disrupted self-visions, new behaviours will emerge and will be 
justified through the biographical narrative. In the following Chapter, the degree to which the 
Troubles impacted the IRM’s decision to end abstention is assessed using the theoretical tools 
described above. Discourse analysis of speeches, policy documents, editorials, and journals for 
example, will demonstrate the gradual shift in the self-concepts of the IRM and how their actions 
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were continually justified through their biographical narrative (including the decision to end 
abstention).   
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Chapter Four 
Introduction 
As detailed in Chapter Three, understanding the self-concepts and biographical narrative 
at work in the Irish Republican Movement (IRM) provides an explanation for the end of 
abstention. The tension between the military self-concept and the political self-concept of the 
IRM created dissonance with the biographical narrative which was defined by the IRM’s 
commitment to ousting the British from Northern Ireland and uniting with the Republic of 
Ireland. While the military self-concept mostly dominated the IRM until the Hunger Strikes, the 
groundwork for a greater role for the political self-concept can be traced back to 1969 when the 
activism of the Provisional set up unrealizable goals. This came to the fore with a number of 
events throughout the Troubles which signalled that rebalancing the IRM’s self-concepts in 
terms of expanding the importance of the political self-concept would be necessary in achieving 
those goals.  This would eventually lead to the taking up of electoral seats in 1986 and therefore 
the ending of abstention.  
This Chapter uncovers the two self-concepts and the biographical narrative of the IRM as 
it evolves through four events: the Lower Falls Curfew
50
, the 1972 and 1975 ceasefires and the 
1981 Hunger Strikes. The intent of this analysis is to demonstrate how the inability of the 
military self-concept to fulfill the biographical narrative of the IRM created dissonance. The re-
balancing of the IRM’s self-concepts, where greater importance was given to the political self-
concept, brought the IRM’s self-concepts back into resonance by demonstrating a way to fulfill 
the biographical narrative. Again, as discussed in Chapter Three, when there is dissonance 
between perceptions of self and an actor’s biographical narrative, feelings of shame arise and the 
                                                          
50
 Hereafter referred to as the Curfew. 
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agency of the actor is hindered; without realigning the IRM’s self-concepts with their 
biographical narrative it would be increasingly unable to act.  
This thesis traces the evolution of the IRM’s identity from one dominated by the military 
self-concept to one that assigned importance to the political self-concept as well. The military 
self-concept is embodied by a number of contextual roles: defender, protector, and liberator. The 
political self-concept is embodied by a different set of contextual roles: negotiator, community 
organizer, propagandist and political agitator. Since 1916, the IRM has been constituted by the 
interplay of these two self-concepts albeit with the military self-concept remaining dominant 
until the successful ending of abstension in 1986. As discussed in Chapter Two, there have been 
points of contestation in the past, creating notable splits in the IRM in 1921, 1926 and 1969. In 
each instance, the splits occurred due to the inability of the IRM to accept the legitimacy of the 
political self-concept for achieving the goals stated in the biographical narrative. When the 
Provisional were formed in 1969 in response to the IRM’s movement toward enlarging the 
political self-concept in the MacGiolla-Goulding leadership, they split because those IRM 
members that formed the Provisional viewed the military self-concept as the primary means for 
achieving their goals. However, after the unsuccessful ceasefires in 1972 and 1975, the political 
self-concept would take on increasing significance under the influence of Gerry Adams. While 
the political self-concept was not given nearly as much credence as the military self-concept until 
the Hunger Strikes, the decision to end abstention in 1986, and to do so without causing a split in 
the IRM, was the ultimate admission that politics had a role to play – that it was a legitimate self-
concept within the biographical narrative of the IRM. 
This Chapter will detail how the events between the Curfew and the Hunger Strikes 
generated dissonance between the IRM’s biographical narrative and its military self-concept. 
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This led to the legitimation of the political self-concept in the form of ending abstention as a 
means to move the IRM’s narrative of achieving a united Ireland forward.  To that end, this 
Chapter is organized into six subsections, beginning with an overview of the self-concepts of the 
IRM at the time of splitting from the MacGiolla-Goulding leadership in 1969 and forming the 
Provisional. A description of the self-concepts of the IRM at this time will assist in 
understanding just how central the abstention policy was. Following this overview, the Chapter 
considers each of the events which shaped the self-concepts and biographical narrative of the 
IRM up to and including the ending of abstention in 1986.   
1969: Emergence of the Provisional 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, the socialist policies of the MacGiolla-Goulding leadership 
created dissonance in the IRM’s biographical narrative by disputing the importance of the 
military self-concept and not putting the ultimate goal of uniting Ireland at the forefront of their 
policies and strategies. Specifically, two actions caused dissonance between the self-concepts 
and biographical narrative of the IRM at this time: the alleged “failure of the IRA to defend the 
people of the North” (White 153), where the military self-concept was a central component of 
IRM’s identity, and the ending of abstention51, where the denial of a political strategy and 
participation in illegitimate political institutions was another central component of the IRM’s 
self-concepts. As a consequence, the Provisional was formed in 1969 by traditionalists, 
abstentionists and other dissidents that viewed the military self-concept as the primary means of 
achieving the narrative goal of a united Ireland. 
                                                          
51
 While the MacGiolla-O’Bradaigh leadership did indeed end abstention in 1969, this caused a split in the IRM. 
Because of their commitment to abstention and the use of physical force to fulfill the biographical narrative, the 
Provisional that were formed as a result of this split were viewed as the true embodiment of the IRM. The 
MacGiolla-Goulding side of the split in the IRM at this time lost influence over the IRA and Sinn Fein and therefore, 
their legitimacy as members of the IRM.  
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Under the MacGiolla-Goulding leadership the IRM had lost much of the influence it once 
had in Northern Ireland, shifting their focus away from militaristic defence through the IRA and 
focusing on the political avenues not traditionally viewed as a prominent self-concept across the 
IRM. MacGiolla and Goulding called for a socialist republic that would be achieved through 
“civil rights reforms and the establishment of political equality” (Smith 81). When and if 
political equality was established, Protestants and Catholics would unite under the “brotherhood 
of the proletariat” (Coogan 105) and collectively resist British colonial rule in Northern Ireland. 
As with the past splits in the IRM, these political strategies lacked broad support among rank and 
file IRM members because the focus on a political self-concept did not align with their narrative 
goals of using armed force to unite Ireland and establish a republic based on the ideals of 1916. 
Goulding himself stated that by 1967 “the movement had become dormant. It wasn’t active in 
any political sense or even in any revolutionary sense. Membership was falling off…Units of the 
IRA and the cumainn of Sinn Fein had become almost non-existent” (Smith 80).  
In support of the attempt to embrace politics as the most important aspect of the IRM’s 
self-concepts, the IRM’s resources were dedicated to assisting the civil rights campaign and 
restricted to protest and activism. Thus, when violence broke out in the North in 1969, Goulding 
stated that “it is not our job to be Catholic defenders. When the time comes, we’ll put it up to the 
official forces, the British Army and the RUC, to defend the people” (White 143). The Northern 
Irish communities traditionally protected by the IRA could no longer look to the IRM for 
assistance in their plight. The lack of defense provided under the MacGiolla-Goulding leadership 
damaged the legitimacy of the IRM to those members that viewed the military self-concept as 
the primary means of achieving their goals as well as to the communities in Northern Ireland that 
relied on the IRM for defense. The actions of the Provisional during the Curfew allowed them to 
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present themselves as the heirs to the IRM’s traditions and re-align their military self-concept 
with their biographical narrative.  
In contrast to the socialist strategies of the Dublin leadership that placed importance on 
the issues of extensive poverty and unemployment and had essentially left the IRM demilitarised 
(Coogan 105), members of the Provisional were hardline militarists who felt the armed struggle 
was the only way to secure the goals of the biographical narrative. The Provisional also believed 
that abstention was a cornerstone of the IRM strategy which ensured that politics played only a 
secondary role in the movement. These two points formed the basis of the IRM biographical 
narrative, which were summed up in a speech given by Jimmy Steele
52
 at a funeral for two IRM 
members:  
Our two martyred comrades whom we honour today went forth to carry 
the fight to the enemy, into enemy territory, using the only methods that 
will ever succeed, not the method of the politicians, nor the 
constitutionalists, but the method of soldiers, the method of armed force. 
The ultimate aim of the Irish nation will never emerge from the political 
or constitutional platform (White 145).    
 
The Provisional argued that the MacGiolla-Goulding leadership had betrayed the biographical 
narrative of the IRM by deviating from the military self-concept. By contrast, the Provisional 
commitment to the military self-concept was the basis of their claim to represent the IRM.  The 
next section will look at the Curfew, which legitimated the Provisional role in the IRM and 
consequently reinforced the dominance of the military self-concept. 
                                                          
52
 Steele was a long-time republican who had fought during the War of Independence, helped to re-establish the 
IRA’s Belfast Brigade in 1925, led a raid on the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 1935, escaped from prison in 1943, and 
then became a high-ranking member of the IRA’s Northern Command (an adjunct of the IRA located in Belfast). As 
an author for many republican publications and the editor for Republican News, Steele was an outspoken critic of 
Goulding-MacGiolla’s motion to end abstention. Steele was one of the leaders of the 1969 split, a founding 
member of the Provisional movement and an influential member until his death in 1970. 
 
 
70 
The 1970 Lower Falls Curfew 
 The first event on the path to ending abstention was counter-intuitively the Curfew. It is 
counter-intuitive in that the Curfew would seem to reinforce the dominance of the military self-
concept in the IRM. However it also set unattainable outcomes that would lead to alternate 
methods best undertaken by the political self-concept as demonstrated during the Hunger Strikes. 
As discussed, the cornerstone of the biographical narrative of the IRM was the forcing of British 
withdrawal from Northern Ireland and the unification of Ireland. When members of the 
Provisional came to the defence of Catholics during the Curfew they successfully enacted their 
military self-concept thereby establishing resonance with their biographical narrative. These 
actions not only garnered a groundswell of support for their cause in Northern Ireland, which 
legitimized them in their role to the people of Northern Ireland, but more importantly they 
demonstrated their commitment to the military self-concept and to their goals in the biographical 
narrative.  
 The Curfew was the first opportunity for the newly formed Provisional to act on the 
military self-concept, re-align this with their narrative actions and, stake a claim as the true 
representation of the IRM. John Kelly
53
, prominent IRM leader throughout the 1960s, described 
the character of the IRM prior to this event. This quote reveals a part of the IRM narrative and 
demonstrates that the military self-concept was the most dominant in the formation of the 
Provisional and prior to the Curfew: 
(T)hose who had pursued the politicisation mind were seen to have failed 
because they hadn’t provided the weapons to defend the nationalist 
population within [Northern Ireland] which was always part of the 
republican philosophy. The traditional republican attitude to Britain’s 
occupation of Ireland was to remove England from Ireland by the use of 
                                                          
53
 Kelly joined the IRA in the 1950s and took part in the IRA campaign along the Northern border. Kelly was a 
founding member of the Provisional movement and one of the leaders of the Provisional IRA.   
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physical force. That changed in 1969, in the context of defending 
nationalism, of defending Catholics within [Northern Ireland], but out of 
that conflict grew, or reawakened the notion of traditional republicanism, 
that we would continue the ideological concept of removing England 
from Ireland that was through physical force... (Alfonso 43).  
 
In contrast to the MacGiolla-Goulding leadership who had pursued politics as an avenue for 
achieving the IRM’s goals, those who formed the Provisional saw themselves as fulfilling the 
traditional role of the IRM: the primary group fighting British imperialism and the harbingers of 
Irish unification in the spirit of the 1916 Republic. The Curfew allowed the Provisional to align 
the military self-concept in the IRM with its biographical narrative by countering the actions of 
the British Army through the use of armed force and proving to the communities in Northern 
Ireland that they were not only willing but able to fulfill their historical role.  
 A number of prominent IRM leaders have discussed the extent to which the actions of the 
Provisional during the Curfew confirmed them in their traditional role and as the true 
representatives of the IRM. During the Curfew, the heavy-handedness of the British Army in the 
raid of the Falls, coupled with the defensive performance of Provisionals such as Billy McKee 
and Joe Cahill, resulted in a groundswell of support for the Provisional and allowed them the 
opportunity to align their military self-concepts with the IRM’s biographical narrative. The 
Provisional IRA (PIRA) Chief of Staff at the time, Sean MacStiofain
54
, stated: 
Coming on top of the successful IRA-led defence of Ballymacarrett and 
other districts, what the battle of the Lower Falls did was to provide 
endless water for the republican guerrilla fish to swim in” (Warner 13).   
 
                                                          
54
 MacStiofain joined the IRA in 1949 and became Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA in 1969 following the split 
with Goulding-MacGiolla. He served as Chief of Staff until 1972 and took part in the negotiations with Whitelaw. 
He was arrested in November 1972 and upon his release the following year, he never regained influence in 
republican ranks. 
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Joe Cahill
55
 shared the sentiment that the Curfew confirmed the Provisional in their role 
in both the eyes of the IRM members and the greater community which it served: “there was an 
upsurge in the number of young people attempting to join the IRA. [The] Belfast Brigade had 
many more potential recruits than [it] could handle” (Warner 13). Adams echoed the notion that 
the Curfew legitimized the Provisional as the legitimate representation of the IRM. He stated that 
engaging loyalist attackers and successfully driving them off was the Provisionals’ “most 
important action since the split” in 1969 because it provided credibility to the Provisionals as the 
true representatives of the IRM (Adams 140). This credibility resulted in support for the 
Provisional program of utilizing the military self-concept to oust the British: “Thousands of 
people who have never been republicans now gave their active support to the IRA; others who 
had never had any time for physical force now accepted it as practical necessity” (Adams 142). 
At the October 1970 ard fheis, President of Sinn Fein Ruairi O’Bradaigh56 described how their 
actions during the Curfew confirmed the Provisional as the true embodiment of IRM: 
You, the true republicans who stood steadfast in defense of the Republic 
against the attack made on it some months ago, are entitled to the respect 
and appreciation of the loyal republican people here in Ireland and in 
exile. You reorganized yourselves in the various organizations and the 
republican Movement is once more a sturdy stronghold…acknowledge 
who is the true and official Sinn Fein, upholding the Constitution of the 
organisation and having the allegiance of the vast majority of Irish 
republicans” (White 163).  
 
                                                          
55
 Cahill joined the IRA’s Belfast Brigade in 1938 and was an active member during the 1950s campaign along the 
Northern border. Cahill fought alongside Billy McKee in the defense of St. Matthews church and was a founding 
member of the Provisional movement. He was elected to the Provisional IRA Army Council in 1970, and in 1971 he 
became the commander of the Belfast Brigade. 
56
 O’Bradaigh joined Sinn Fein in 1950 and the IRA in 1951. He participated in the 1950s Border campaign and he 
served as the IRA Chief of Staff from 1958-59 and 1960-62. O’Bradaigh was one of the leaders of the split with 
Goulding-MacGiolla in 1969, and one of the founding members of the Provisional movement. He was President of 
Sinn Fein from 1970-83 and was elected to the IRA Army Council from 1970 to at least 1975. 
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In this speech, O’Bradaigh not only demonstrates the legitimacy of the Provisional but 
his words highlight the shift from a movement that stressed the use of politics to achieve the 
IRM’s goals under MacGiolla-Goulding to one that believed primarily in physical force and the 
military self-concept – realigning their role as military actor and their biographical narrative 
which called for the use of physical force to achieve the movement’s stated goals. Leading up to 
and during the next event taken up by this Chapter, the 1972 ceasefire, the IRM, now embodied 
by the Provisionals, reinforced the dominance of the military self-concept in that they continued 
their armed campaign against the British, eventually bringing the British to the negotiating table 
through these efforts. As will be discussed, because the IRM focused on the military self-concept 
to fulfill their biographical narrative they were unable to enact the political self-concept when 
attempting to gain ground during the ceasefire negotiations. This signalled the first tensions 
between the military and political self-concepts. 
The 1972 Ceasefire 
 The 1972 ceasefire is the first event that occurred during the Troubles that caused tension 
between the military self-concept and political self-concept, thereby creating dissonance in the 
IRM’s biographical narrative. Up until the ceasefire, the biographical narrative of achieving a 
united Ireland by forcing a British withdrawal resonated with the domination of the military self-
concept. While seemingly assuming the role of political actor by engaging in political 
negotiations during the ceasefire, this was only important insofar as it supported the military 
campaign. In short, the political self-concept was only enacted to represent what the military had 
achieved. It was the inability to secure British withdrawal through the negotiations that began to 
cause tension between the IRM’s biographical narrative and its self-concepts. It started to 
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become clear to some in the IRM leadership that the political self-concept would need to be 
afforded a larger role in order to achieve the goals of the biographical narrative.  
 Following the Curfew, the Provisional leadership felt that the movement had gained 
strength and would be victorious in the effort to oust the British. As mentioned in the previous 
section, the Curfew generated resonance between the military self-concept and the biographical 
narrative of the IRM. The support from the community was read as support for the physical force 
strategy they were pursuing and all of the IRM’s resources had been dedicated to increasing the 
capability of the IRA. In an interview many years after the fact, MacStiofain indicated that the 
state of the IRA at this time was “very good, I think, the best and better IRA for fifty years. More 
men, ammunition, equipment and very, very good morale” (MacStiofain). When asked if he felt 
that they were winning (in terms of getting the British to withdraw), MacStiofain unequivocally 
answered “yes” (MacStiofain). In his “Army Statement” in 1971, MacStiofain assured 
republicans that the IRA was “battle hardened, ready to face up to the hardships of the final 
phase which of course will be more intensive than anything experienced thus far” (White 173). 
These quotations provide evidence of the IRM’s biographical narrative at this time, wherein the 
leadership believed the movement was strong enough to achieve their goals militarily and to 
continue to fulfill the biographical narrative through that form of action only.  
This was not disputed by the Sinn Fein leadership. At the 1971 ard fheis, O’Bradaigh 
conceded that the goal was “to bring down Stormont by making the area ungovernable” followed 
by “an all-out effort to force British evacuation and disengagement” (White 174). In this strategy 
the IRA played the primary role through the military self-concept, while Sinn Fein was relegated 
to providing leadership to the civil resistance campaign. Sinn Fein’s role would become 
important when the inevitable victory was won, and they could then “go to all people North and 
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South, unionist and nationalist with our Social and Economic programme and ask them to join 
with us in building the Democratic Socialist Republic” (White 174). These statements reveal that 
the armed struggle, and therefore the military self-concept, was still perceived as the main driver 
of the goals of republicanism prior to the 1972 ceasefire.  
Further to the point that the IRM self-concepts had not experienced any tension leading 
up to the ceasefire, O’Bradaighs’ presidential address paid service to IRM military self-concepts 
and the fact they were not only the strongest oppositional force to British imperialism, but the 
only force that could accomplish the movements’ goals: 
We must not fail our struggling people striving to be free of social, 
economic, cultural and political servitude; we dare not fail our dead—and 
there have been so many to make the supreme sacrifice in the past year—
who made an act of faith in us, their comrades. Our oppressed and 
harassed people in the streets and the countryside, our menfolk being 
subjected to unspeakable degradations in the torture mills, our women 
and men in the concentration camps and prison cells, our exiled kith and 
kin, all look to us (White 174). 
 
For O’Bradaigh and other leaders, the 1972 ceasefire was confirmation that the military strategy 
had been successful, and that the IRM was at liberty to make any demands of the British that 
they saw fit. This speech summed up the denial of a political apparatus and the prioritization of 
the armed struggle as the primary self-concept, thereby legitimizing the actions of the IRM 
leading up to and during the ceasefire through the biographical narrative.  
 When the ceasefire was called, the Provisional movement saw it as a victory for their 
military pursuits, and two events in particular validated the military self-concept and its 
alignment with the IRM’s biographical narrative: the dismantling of Stormont and the granting 
of Special Category Status. The first evidence of victory was the fall of Stormont, the parliament 
of Northern Ireland. The dismantling of the political apparatus responsible for the oppression of 
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Catholics was one of the Provisionals’ demands in return for ceasing the armed struggle. This 
reinforced the dominance of the military self-concept by proving to the IRM that their narrative 
goals could be achieved through military means alone. The dismantling of Stormont in and of 
itself was not enough for the IRM leadership that were emboldened by this compromise. 
MacStiofain released a statement stating that although disassembling Stormont was “an advance 
on previous British Government attitudes” (White 178), the campaign would continue until all of 
their demands were met. This illustrates the IRM’s perception that they were close to victory 
and, therefore, to achieving their stated goal of removing the British from Northern Ireland. The 
second piece of evidence that the IRM was winning and that their actions were successful was 
the granting of Special Category Status. In order to even begin negotiations, the IRM leadership 
had demanded the granting of Special Category Status for the prisoners as well as the release of 
Adams. For the IRM leadership, Special Category Status legitimized the military self-concept: 
they were soldiers of a legitimate army fighting a war against an imperial oppressor, not common 
criminals. Thus, when Whitelaw invited a number of IRM leaders to negotiate the terms of 
complete ceasefire, the IRM thought that they had won the war.  
The dominance of the military self-concept led the IRM delegation to take a hard line in 
the negotiations, in which their stubbornness is evidenced in a quote by MacStiofain: 
“concessions be damned, we want our freedom” (Smith 106). As a result of this attitude and the 
inability to enlarge the importance of the political self-concept, when the meeting began 
MacStiofain and the other delegates had “no interest” in anything Whitelaw had to say. Instead, 
they allowed him to speak for five minutes before reading their statement. In his 1997 interview 
with Frontline, MacStiofain stated that “we call[ed] on the British government to publicly 
acknowledge the right to the Irish people, [to] act in one unit to decide the future of Ireland” 
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(MacStiofain). They subsequently demanded a “military and political withdrawal” of the British 
from Northern Ireland. Though in his 1997 interview with Frontline MacStiofain admitted that 
“maybe” their demands were “hopelessly unrealistic”, in 1972 they gave Whitelaw only “three 
days for an answer” (MacStiofain). According to MacStiofain, “the British and the UDA57 broke 
the bloody truce”, at which time “the leadership had an order to all units in the north, [to] get 
back into offensive action and…intensify the campaign” (MacStiofain). While the leadership 
held steadfast to the belief that the armed struggle would be the sole means of fulfilling the 
biographical narrative and were strengthened in that belief in the lead-up to the ceasefire, it was 
the breakdown of this negotiation and subsequent increase in the military campaign that would 
have a lasting impact on the self-concepts of the IRM. The inability to embrace the role of 
political negotiator due to the dominance of the military self-concept caused dissonance with the 
biographical narrative –it had become evident to some influential members in the IRM, such as 
Adams, that a political role would be needed to achieve the narrative goals of the movement. 
This represented the first challenge to the IRM’s self-concept as a primarily military actor. 
 The inability to secure British withdrawal from Ireland undermined the belief that the 
military struggle would ensure a quick victory for the IRM and highlighted the tension between 
militarism and politics within the movements’ self-concepts. As mentioned, this tension 
represented the first challenge to the IRM in terms of whether their self-concept aligned with 
their biographical narrative. To that end, following the 1972 ceasefire, talk of including a greater 
role for politics began to enter the ranks. It had become clear to some members of the IRM, 
specifically Adams and his peers, that it was not enough to bring the British to the negotiating 
table through military means in order to achieve their goals; there should also be a clear political 
                                                          
57
 The Ulster Defense Association was the largest loyalist paramilitary in Northern Ireland. 
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strategy both in order to carry out negotiations properly as well as to put forward demands that 
were possible and realistic. Although it would take additional challenges to the IRM’s self-
concepts to re-balance the military self-concept and the political self-concept, this is the first 
instance in which the need for a greater political role enters the IRM’s self-concepts.  
One of the more vocal republicans was Adams, who recognized the need for a more 
robust political approach immediately following the breakdown of the truce. In his 
autobiography, Adams discusses the disjointed relationships between the IRM leaders in the 
delegation that negotiated with Whitelaw. Adams alludes to the fact that MacStiofain “found it 
difficult to relate to [the younger activists], particularly those from Belfast” (Adams 200). This 
created a dissonance between the younger and older members of the delegation which was 
coupled with “a certain tension between MacStiofain, O’Bradaigh and O’Conaill” (Adams 200). 
For Adams, this meant that “there was no evidence of collective leadership on their part or of an 
appreciation of the need for this” (Adams 200). This quotation illustrates that while the 
leadership shared the same goals there was disagreement as to what self-concepts needed to be 
utilized in order to achieve it. Specifically there was a tension between those who saw the 
military self-concept embodied by the actions of the IRA as the primary means for achieving 
their goals and those that felt the political self-concept embodied by Sinn Fein was, to some 
degree, worth pursuing.   
Additionally, Adams reveals that he was aware of the lack of political direction on the 
part of the delegation before the negotiations began, and he, at the time, advocated clarity:  
I argued very strongly against the course of action which was being 
suggested, which appeared to see the pending negotiations as if they were 
a follow-through to the treaty talks of 1920, and which proposed a very 
formalised approach to our engagement with the British government 
(201).   
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Adams realized that the delegation was lacking a political direction and was utterly unprepared 
for its meeting with the British government. While others had gauged the meeting as successful, 
(i.e. MacStiofain proclaimed “Jesus, we have it!” when they were given time to discuss matters 
privately), Adams felt that  
the meeting had been…part of the British government’s exploratory 
approach…They had shown no signs of conceding republican demands, 
and I took a fairly absolutist position regarding these demands. I was 
conscious of the historical nature of the negotiations. We were in a direct 
line of descent from the republicans of 1920—the last time such 
discussions had occurred—but they had represented a revolutionary 
government with massive support. A lot had changed since then (206).  
 
This quote not only emphasizes the importance of connecting to the past in order to provide 
legitimacy to the movement, but it demonstrates that Adams had begun to recognize the 
necessity of a public base of support through the strategy broadening of the political self-
concept. For Adams, in order to fulfill the IRM goals as outlined in their biographical narrative, 
purely military tactics would not be enough, as was evidenced in the 1972 ceasefire and through 
the narrative provided above. It was at this moment that the crusade to politicize the movement 
began and the 1975 ceasefire would provide the impetus for the acceptance of a political self-
concept that was much broader than that accepted in 1972.  
The 1975 ceasefire 
 The third event considered in this Chapter is the 1975 ceasefire. The 1975 ceasefire 
represents the second challenge to the IRM in terms of the tension between the two self-concepts 
and the dissonance this caused with its biographical narrative. The biographical narrative of the 
IRM still committed the movement to forcing British withdrawal and unifying Northern Ireland 
with the Republic, and Members of the IRM still viewed the military self-concept as the primary 
means for achieving that goal. While the military effort had made great strides leading up to 
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1975, the inability of the leadership to secure their demands for a second time worked to cause 
further tension between the IRM’s two self-concepts. For a second time in three years, the 
military self-concept was unable to fulfill the commitments of the biographical narrative. It is at 
this juncture that the need to enlarge the political self-concept in order to fulfill the promise of 
what the military self-concept had begun through the armed struggle was realized.  Adams and 
his associates began introducing politics as means of moving from military victory to achieving 
British withdrawal and the eventual unification of Ireland.  
 After the 1972 ceasefire, it was recognized by some members that the IRM required a 
degree of political know-how if they were to negotiate with the British. However, the IRM 
remained committed to the armed struggle and the military self-concept as the primary means for 
securing British withdrawal. Three articles from a 1974 edition of Republican News support this 
assertion: “Are You a Deserter” by an anonymous author, “Guerilla Warfare” by Thomas Neils 
and “No Ceasefire” also by an anonymous author. As the official monthly newsletter of Sinn 
Fein, these articles are a form of propaganda that represent the views of the leadership and 
therefore speak to the biographical narrative of the movement which mainly focused on propping 
up the armed struggle as the means through which Irish unity would be achieved.  
 The first article, Guerilla Warfare, discusses the success of the military struggle until this 
point: 
The new IRA adopted the tactics of guerilla warfare. Since then their 
success has become assured. They have been able to make the British 
attempts to hold onto Ireland so expensive that the Imperialists have 
reluctantly been forced to relinquish their covetous hands from three 
quarters of Irish soil (Neils 4).  
 
In this excerpt from Neils’ article, it is clear that the leadership are committed to the armed 
struggle: they view it as having already brought a degree of victory, they believe that this 
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strategy guarantees a victory in the future and they are therefore steadfast in their belief that the 
military self-concept is the primary means through which they will achieve their goals. Neils also 
pays homage to the role of Sinn Fein: “Since the guerilla fighter needs the support of the 
populace in order to survive, he requires having some political aim which will gain their 
sympathy. The guerilla fighter is thus a propagandist, one who sows the seeds of the 
revolutionary idea” (Neils 2). The article can be viewed as a propping-up of the physical force 
aspect of IRM, and this quotation illustrates that the many of the IRM’s members at this time 
saw the political actor role as secondary to their military pursuits – this role would only be useful 
once victory had been achieved by the military actor.  
 In the article “Are You a Deserter?” the message is aimed at those who have become 
disillusioned by the campaign against the British, suggesting that the dissonance between 
military actor and the IRM’s biographical narrative was very real: 
Are YOU serving Ireland and her cause today? Or are you one of the 
many who have become tired or disgruntled in the struggle or who now 
claim immunity from further service? Are you content to live with your 
record – prison or otherwise as an answer to your critics – looking with 
scorn or contempt on the men, especially the younger generation, who 
stepped into the places vacated by you and your friends? Remember it 
was your words, your service, your activities and sacrifices that recruited 
these men into the movement. It was you who sounded the clarion for 
youth to take their places in the ranks of the republican 
movement…There is no earthly excuse for the inactivity of anyone 
claiming republican principles today, providing he or she is physically fit, 
with no great personal responsibilities (1).  
 
As previously stated, the failure of the 1972 ceasefire to provide any relief was 
demoralizing for some members of the IRM as well as the Northern Irish communities which 
they served and was the first instance in which the IRM’s self-concepts came into tension. After 
three more years of violence, the IRM was not experiencing the same increase in membership as 
they had after the Curfew. This article was aimed at increasing membership and support. 
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Furthermore, this quote reveals that the type of support required was militaristic in nature. Use of 
the terms “recruit”, “ranks” and “service”, with references to prison, demonstrate to the reader 
that the leadership was most interested in enrolling military-minded members, not in expanding a 
political program.   
 Finally, “No Ceasefire” discusses the fact that various organizations and community 
members had been calling on the IRM to declare a ceasefire, again highlighting the perception in 
the IRM and in the community that the military actor role was not enough to achieve the 
narrative goals: 
During recent days various individuals and groups have called on [the 
IRA] to lay down their arms and to cease their military struggle which is 
aimed at withdrawal of the English garrison from Ireland and the 
establishment of an independent All-Ireland Republic. We have noted 
that these calls have been welcomed by the English government and the 
Dublin government…Derry Brigade, Mid Ulster Brigade and South 
Down Brigade, [IRA] recently issued statements asserting that the 
military struggle would continue until the English garrison withdraws” 
(1).   
 
This statement reveals that, even in 1974, the IRM leadership was not at all considering 
stopping the military struggle and pursuing a political route to achieve their goals. Although the 
Northern Ireland communities that relied on the IRM had obviously become disheartened by the 
violence of the previous years, as can be seen in their call to lay down arms, the leadership still 
strongly believed that the military self-concept would force Britain to withdraw so that a united 
Ireland could be established. Following the long and drawn-out 1975 ceasefire, this stance would 
come under increasing criticism and scrutiny as the dissonance between the IRM self-concepts 
and their biographical narrative became far more apparent. 
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 The drawn-out 1975 ceasefire was initiated by the British government in order to weaken 
the movement and prepare to introduce the criminalisation and ulsterization policies. As 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees stated in February of 1975:  
The importance of a ceasefire is that it offers us the opportunity to create 
the conditions in which the Provisionals’ ‘military’ organization and 
structure may be weakened. They would not find it easy to start a 
campaign again from scratch (O’Dochartaigh 4-5).  
 
While this does not allude to the fact that the British attempted to weaken the IRM for the sole 
purpose of introducing their two new policies, it does reveal that they wished to further 
demoralise the movement. As discussed in Chapter Two, these policies, especially the 
criminalization policy, were aimed at casting members of the IRM as petty criminals, thereby 
undermining the legitimacy of their military self-concept. Thus, these policies represent one of 
the triggers for change, in the form of politicization, which took hold of the movement after 
1975. Two members of the IRM, Brendan Hughes
58
 and Adams, recognized this tactic for what it 
was at the time. In an interview on the twentieth anniversary of the Hunger Strikes, Hughes 
talked about the 1975 ceasefire and the British strategy to weaken the Provisional: 
[at] the end of 1974/75 another ceasefire was called, this time it was a 
long drawn out ceasefire and the intentions of the British at that time was 
[sic] to get the IRA involved in a long drawn out ceasefire, and an 
attempt to normalise the situation, criminalise the situation and to pacify 
the situation. That basically meant to get the British troops off the street, 
the RUC back onto the street and put republicans in jail. That they done 
[sic]” (Hughes). 
 
                                                          
58
 Hughes joined the Provisional IRA in 1969 and by 1972 he was the Officer Commanding of the Provisional IRA 
Belfast Brigade. He was arrested in May 1974 and convicted in 1976 at a time when the British had removed 
Special Category Status. Hughes became the Officer Commanding of the IRA prisoners and led the initial Hunger 
Strike that began in May 1980 and ended 53 days later. 
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Hughes believed, even in 2001, that the ceasefire was intended to decrease the military 
capability of the IRM and reduce the degree to which this struggle was viewed as a legitimate 
one. Similarly, Adams writes in his autobiography: 
It appeared to me inside Long Kesh that the long protracted truce which 
the IRA started in December 1974, and the confusion which arose as this 
continued in tandem with [criminalisation], was to the benefit of the 
British and not to the advantage of the anti-imperialist struggle…British 
strategy between the fall of Stormont and the end of 1975 had consisted 
principally of a war of political suppression…by 1975 a strategy had 
begun to be implemented which sought, in broad terms, to deny the 
political nature of the struggle…the British government used the lengthy 
bilateral truce of 1974-75, and were unwittingly assisted by republicans, 
whose self-destructive feuding spread dismay and contempt amongst 
many of their supporters  (249-255).   
 
This excerpt shows that, whether or not it was the British intention, the IRM believed that 
the length and ultimate failure of the ceasefire was intended to break the movement militarily as 
well as politically. Furthermore, Adams reveals in this quotation the extent to which 
disagreement existed within the movement between those who wished to pursue a political route 
to peace and those who were committed to the physical force tradition. Because this is how IRM 
members such as Hughes and Adams read the truce, they began to initiate a strategy to contest 
the British. This is when the political self-concept, albeit minuscule at first, is earnestly 
embraced as a legitimate self-concept in the IRM. 
 Both Hughes and Adams recognized the absolute necessity for engaging as political 
actors following the 1975 ceasefire. Due to the demoralising effect of the ceasefire among the 
membership and the community, Hughes and Adams began to enlarge the political self-concept 
to regain resonance with their biographical narrative. In an interview with Radio Free Eireann, 
Hughes said that people like he and Adams “opposed the ceasefire…Gerry wrote many articles 
warning the leadership that you’re getting drawn into a long drawn-out ceasefire, the British are 
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trying to stop the war” (Hughes). In light of this realization within the prison, Hughes says 
Adams took it upon himself to begin pushing for education and dialogue among prisoners: 
Gerry was the main driving force behind this [idea] that we need 
politically educated rank and file… and within Long Kesh we began to 
do that. We had debates, we had discussions, we had arguments we read 
about the Palestinian Cause we read about the South African Cause, we 
debated all these causes and we became politically educated, we became 
not just a soldier who was just a person who was able to fire a gun, but a 
person who was able to think before he fired a gun. So all that started 
there… (Hughes).  
 
 
According to this interview with Hughes, political education began in the prison as a 
direct result of the failure of the 1975 ceasefire and the attempts of the British to criminalise the 
IRM struggle. While Adams and those like him were not yet pushing for an increased role for 
Sinn Fein, they were certainly becoming more critical of the current leaderships position and 
their whole-hearted commitment to a strictly military struggle: 
I also wanted to develop collective political discussion and education, 
and as a project we took Eire Nua, the Sinn Fein programme. First we 
educated ourselves as to its content, then we critically reviewed the 
programme and identified what we thought was wrong with it… We 
considered questions such as communication with the base of our 
support, the role of newspapers, bulletins, co-ops, tenants’ associations 
and women’s organizations, as means of empowering people…there was 
a core of people who were political animals, who were keen to kick 
issues around. They became the catalyst for an intensive process of 
debate, dialogue and education, and we succeeded in getting a large turn-
out for a number of projects, in which we explored new ways of 
examining issues (246).  
 
 The process of politicization that Adams and his followers began in prison began to take 
hold among some of the leadership outside of the prisons. For example, the editor of the 
Republican News, requested that Adams contribute some pieces. Adams’ articles penned under 
the name ‘Brownie’ addressed “more underlying questions regarding the nature and relevance of 
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[republican] political beliefs and practice” (248). These criticisms were broadcast to the IRM 
members and Northern Irish communities in the form of a monthly newsletter and they reveal the 
extent to which politics was embraced in the self-concepts of the IRM at this time. In this series 
of articles, Adams explicitly proposed increasing the role of the political wing of the movement: 
I embarked on discussions of what I called ‘active abstentionism’ and 
‘active republicanism’. I suggested that we as republicans should be 
engaged in building the elements of alternative administration… In 
writing of ‘The National Alternative’, I argued the need to build 
structures, including street committees, establishing people’s taxis in 
place of bus service, people’s militias in place of the RUC (249).  
 
For Adams and other young northern members of the movement who would soon take 
over its leadership, the primary issue facing the IRM was the unwavering commitment to the 
armed struggle: “the main problem was that the struggle had been limited to armed struggle. 
Once this stopped, the struggle stopped” (250). The 1975 ceasefire once again proved that 
physical force could only get the British to the negotiating table; it would no longer be viewed as 
the means through which the IRM’s demands would be met. In order to recreate resonance with 
the biographical narrative, they “desperately needed to rebuild a sense of political direction 
which would govern all our activities and which would offer [republicans] a strategic overview” 
(Adams 262). The 1981 Hunger Strikes that occurred over the ending of Special Category Status 
would provide a platform through which a change in the form of adopting a political strategy 
could be legitimized. This legitimization aligned the IRM’s self-concepts and their biographical 
narrative in terms of having a political strategy and was necessary to avoiding a split in the 
movement, which had occurred in every instance wherein the IRM embarked on enlarging the 
political self-concept. More importantly, this opened the doors to the ending of abstention and 
taking up electoral seats in 1986. 
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The 1981 Hunger Strikes 
The Hunger Strikes that occurred in 1981 and 1982 are the third challenge to the IRM 
that caused dissonance in the biographical narrative due to the tension between the military self-
concept and political self-concept. The events in 1972 and 1975 had made it evident to some in 
the IRM leadership that a shift in self-concepts was necessary for achieving the biographical 
narrative’s goals of British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and a united Ireland. However, 
until the Hunger Strikes the IRM continued to view the dominance of the military self-concept as 
the primary means for achieving those goals. As noted in Chapter Two, the Hunger Strikes 
occurred as a result of the British criminalisation policy, and particularly the removal of Special 
Category Status. This offered an opportunity for insisting on the political nature of the struggle 
and to rebalance the self-concepts to give greater importance to the political self-concept while 
maintaining the importance of the military self-concept. When a number of Hunger Strikers ran 
in elections and were victorious, the extent to which the political self-concept in terms of running 
in elections and the military self-concept in terms of the continuation of the armed struggle could 
co-exist and re-establish resonance with the biographical narrative was made evident. It was only 
through this event that the process of creating a larger role for the political self-concept could 
begin in earnest. This shift in the IRM’s self-concept culminated in the Armalite and Ballot Box 
Strategy of 1981, wherein Sinn Fein voted to enter elections under the IRM banner thereby 
embracing the political self-concept that had been subservient to the military self-concept for the 
last twelve years.  
Following the demoralisation of the 1975 ceasefire and the realization that the movement 
required more than the dependence on the military struggle, talk of enlarging the role for politics 
began among some Members of the IRM’s leadership. There were disagreements between the 
older leadership under O’Bradaigh and the young northerners under Adams whose influence was 
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increasing within the IRM. The older leadership at this time still felt disdain for politics and 
remained committed to ousting the British using physical force: 
Ruairi occupied a particularly difficult role as president of Sinn Fein 
because the republican struggle was at the time entirely dominated by the 
IRA. Abstentionism and the lack of an electoral strategy…had their 
effect, but more tellingly Sinn Fein was in many ways a victim of the 
aversion to politics which marked republicanism at this time. Politics and 
politicians were widely blamed for the calamity of 1969…In this context 
Sinn Fein was eclipsed by the IRA, and there was little appetite for 
political work of the more conventional kind (Adams 263).   
 
Despite the fact that some IRM members and leaders were not comfortable with “conventional” 
politics as the above quote demonstrates the project of building a sense of political direction in 
the IRM’s self-concepts was undertaken by Adams and his likeminded comrades: 
Within Sinn Fein a younger, northern element, of which I was one, began 
to play a role in seeking development and change in political 
strategy…Politically, however, we encountered resistance to the direction 
we were pursuing, particularly when we argued for the development of 
an electoral strategy (Adams 263-4). 
 
Of course, the old leadership was concerned that pursuing electoralism and expanding the 
political self-concept would require ending the abstentionist platform which had caused splits in 
the movement in 1921, 1926 and 1969. They believed that another such split would be highly 
detrimental to the IRM in the midst of a decade-long war.  However, it had become evident to 
others in the IRM leadership that the military self-concept was not enough to fulfill the stated 
goal of achieving a united Ireland – if the political self-concept was not given greater 
importance, the movement would be increasingly unable to act to achieve their goals due to the 
dissonance between these two self-concepts. To overcome the worries of the old leadership and, 
more importantly, to create resonance between self-concepts and biographical narrative, Adams 
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would have to demonstrate how the political self-concept aligned with the IRM’s biographical 
narrative.  
As discussed, the failure of the two ceasefires to achieve victory led many members 
within the IRM who fell under Adams’ sphere of influence to recognize the need for some sense 
of a political strategy in order to achieve their stated goals. In an interview with author Rogelio 
Alonso, a former IRA volunteer admitted: 
Armed struggle was limited… armed struggle was never going to free 
Ireland, it was never going to get a united Ireland that we hoped for, 
everyone was aware of that, volunteers were aware of that, I was even 
aware of it even then. That wasn’t going to be the aim, we had to go into 
negotiations, at some stage of the game we had to negotiate and we had 
to bring an end… (Alonso 66). 
 
As this quote reveals, a need to embrace the political self-concept of the IRM began to be 
debated, even at the rank-and-file level. This suggests the recurring tension in the self-concepts 
and biographical narrative of the republican movement: were they soldiers fighting for 
independence or politicians seeking redress through the ballot box? At the level of the up-and-
coming leadership under Adams, they could be, and needed to be both, and the justification for 
increasing the importance of the political self-concept in order to support their biographical 
narrative was well underway. In a very public speech given by Adams in 1979 he stated the 
following: 
The Republic declared in 1916….cannot be fully re-established solely by 
military means, for while obstructions and obstacles may be cleared 
militarily and gains made may be protected militarily, the re-
establishment of the Republic needs more than a military 
alternative…Our most glaring weakness to date lies in our failure to 
develop revolutionary politics and to build a strong political alternative to 
so-called constitutional politics…A British withdrawal can be secured 
more quickly and in more favorable conditions if it is achieved not only 
because of the IRA military threat, but also because resistance to British 
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rule has been channelled and built into an alternative political movement 
(Adams 278).  
 
While Adams’ call for a political strategy could have possibly caused dissention and 
anger among some of the older IRM members and leaders, the fact that he clearly states that 
increasing the importance of the political self-concept will work to support the military self-
concept is an important one. Rather than calling for the laying down of arms, Adams is alluding 
to the need for both wings of the movement to play equal roles, thereby alleviating the fears of 
physical force traditionalists and aligning narrative actions with the self-concepts held by the 
IRM since the 1969 Curfew. In one of his prison writings, Bobby Sands
59
 made a similar 
comment regarding the need for politics: 
It must be said that an armed people are by no means a sure guarantee to 
liberation. Our guns may kill our enemies but unless we direct them with 
the politics of a revolutionary people they will eventually kill ourselves. 
Guns don’t win wars; guns and bombs may kill a man but they cannot 
lead a man…nor will they ever coerce an unyielding man to yield” 
(Adams 287).  
 
In this statement, Sands, a very prominent and influential republican, argued for the need to 
increase the role of politics while maintaining a connection to the armed struggle. Again, it is this 
connection that made Adams and his followers’ plan successful – they did not simply halt the 
military struggle and end the dominance of the military self-concept, they attempted to justify 
engaging in politics by aligning it with the self-concepts of the movement in the biographical 
narrative.  
 Not only did the IRM begin to openly discuss politics, and in turn increase the 
importance of the political self-concept to better accomplish their narrative goals, they also 
                                                          
59
 Sands joined the Provisional IRA in June 1972. In 1977 he was sentenced to 14 years in jail for his involvement in 
a gun battle with the Royal Ulster Constabulary. While in prison, Sands wrote both journalistic articles and poetry 
and in 1980 he succeeded Hughes as the Officer Commanding of the IRA prisoners. Sands led the ten men who lost 
their lives in the 1981 Hunger Strike. 
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embarked on a process of education that was meant to politicise the membership. Beginning in 
1979, the IRM began a series of educational courses for members of Sinn Fein and the IRA 
called the “Republican Lecture Series”. Particularly, the “New Members Course” reveals the 
extent to which a strategic political direction, and an enlarged role for Sinn Fein, existed in 1979. 
The course outlines that the role of Sinn Fein consists of: “Acting as the Movement’s political 
link with the people”; “Implementing the Movement’s social and economic policy”; and, 
“Organising electoral work” (Sinn Fein Education Department). These three aspects of Sinn 
Fein’s work are evidence that the political wing of the movement was no longer simply 
constrained to agitation and propaganda and that the political organization of the IRM would be 
encompassing of a more participatory role. The course also states that “Sinn Fein supports in 
principle the legitimate struggle being waged by the IRA” (Sinn Fein Education Department) 
which illustrates the degree to which these two elements of the IRM’s self-concepts were 
inextricably linked as well as the importance of pacifying the physical force traditionalists. This 
provided legitimacy to increasing the importance of the political self-concept because it claimed 
that both a military strategy and politics would support the biographical narrative of the IRM. 
While it was difficult to start the process of politicization and justify these claims to all of the 
IRM, especially the official leaders such as O’Bradaigh, the Hunger Strike would force the IRM 
to contemplate some participation in politics and allow Adams and those like him to pursue their 
goals further. 
 The Hunger Strikes contributed greatly to the legitimacy of the changes in the IRM as it 
provided not only an opportunity to adjust the self-concepts of the movement to be more 
inclusive of a political actor role, but it also provided a platform through which this could be 
justified to the IRM members and leaders as well as the broader Irish public. Both prisoners as 
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well as the leadership recognized the importance of securing the five demands of the prisoners
60
. 
Without the fulfillment of these demands, IRM prisoners were considered common criminals. 
This delegitimized the struggle and challenged their self-concepts. In the first entry of the diary 
he kept during the first seventeen days of the Hunger Strikes, Sands wrote: 
I am a political prisoner. I am a political prisoner because I am a casualty 
of a perennial war that is being fought between the oppressed Irish people 
and an alien, oppressive, unwanted regime that refuses to withdraw from 
our land. I believe and stand by the God-given right of the Irish nation to 
sovereign independence, and the right of any Irishman or woman to 
assert this right in armed revolution. That is why I am incarcerated, naked 
and tortured….I believe I am but another of those wretched Irishmen 
born of a risen generation with a deeply rooted and unquenchable desire 
for freedom. I am dying not just to attempt to end the barbarity of H-
Block, or to gain the rightful recognition of a political prisoner, but 
primarily because what is lost in here is lost for the Republic and those 
wretched oppressed whom I am deeply proud to know as the ‘risen 
people’” (Sands). 
In this entry, Sands indicates that he is both on strike for political status and that this 
recognition is inextricably linked to the cause outside of prison. This political status was linked 
to the legitimacy of the IRM’s military self-concept because republican prisoners were prisoners 
of war; even though they were being viewed as criminals, they saw themselves as a legitimate 
army fighting an imperial oppressor. The need to demonstrate the legitimacy of IRM’s military 
self-concepts gave Adams the opportunity to argue for the enlargement of the role of politics and 
to justify the incorporation of an electoral strategy for achieving their stated goals:  
In Sinn Fein we had promised to intensify our efforts on the outside, but 
hard as the H-Block/Armagh Committee worked, there was no sign of 
movement on the issue from the British government. The prisoners felt 
that little progress was being made either by our campaign of protests or 
by the IRA’s campaign of shooting prison wardens (Adams 287).   
                                                          
60
 The five demands were as follows: the right to wear their own clothing at all times; exemption from all forms of 
penal labour; free association with each other at all hours; the right to organise their own recreational and 
educational programmes; and full restoration of remission. 
 
 
93 
 
As this quotation demonstrates, it was at this point that it was realized that something more had 
to be done to address the plight of the prisoners. The leadership decided that they would use the 
situation in the prisons to demonstrate the need for incorporating a greater use of politics in the 
movement, the necessity of political status, and how a political strategy encompassing 
electoralism fit into the goals dictated by the narrative established in 1969:   
We had looked positively at electoralism, and we had recognised the 
importance of the prison issue…and the prisoners had become a prime 
focus of the republican struggle… It was inevitable that republicans 
would confront this British strategy head-on, to defeat the policy of 
‘criminalization’ and to insist upon the political character of our struggle 
(Adams 283-4).  
 
As mentioned above, it was decided that prisoners would run in a number of elections, 
and they won massive popular support. In the eyes of the IRM, the electoral success of the 
prisoners confirmed that the people of Ireland supported the idea that their political self-concept 
could co-exist with their military self-concept, albeit still with a lesser degree of importance. 
According to Richard O’Rawe61:  
In many ways you could argue that we achieved political status with the 
election of Bobby Sands. In the eyes of Ireland, we had, in that 
constituency of Fermanagh and South Tyrone, a clear majority of the 
people that believed Bobby Sands was a political prisoner. That 
ultimately is the verdict of the people that were first and foremost our 
target constituency (qtd. in Alonso 106). 
 
The realization that a majority of people in the Republic of Ireland supported the plight of 
the prisoners led the Thatcher administration to eventually concede to the five demands. The 
legitimacy of both the prisoners and of the struggle was confirmed through this concession. In 
                                                          
61
 O’Rawe was a Provisional IRA volunteer as well as the Public Relations Officer for the prisoners during the 1981 
Hunger Strikes. 
 
 
94 
his interview with Radio Free Eierann, Hughes commented on his feelings at the end of the 
Strike: 
I have spent almost eight year in prison with my own clothes with 
political status, and here they were trying to take it away from us…and 
eventually they had to concede that we were political prisoners, they 
could not control us, they tried to control us… we resisted every attempt 
to the point where ten men died…and Thatcher... Thatcher. That woman. 
Thatcher…just could not accept the fact that we were political 
prisoners…we were fighting for a cause (Hughes). 
 
Not only did the Hunger Strikes legitimize the armed struggle in regard to the granting of Special 
Category Status, it also acted as the vehicle through which Adams and his followers would 
demonstrate that an electoral strategy could co-exist with physical force. Through this, Adams 
and his like-minded colleagues were able to re-balance the IRM’s self-concepts to increase the 
importance of the political self-concept while maintaining the importance of the military self-
concept and align those with their biographical narrative.  
 The electoral success of the prisoners during the Hunger Strikes provided much-needed 
evidence that electoralism could exist alongside an armed campaign. This evidence helped to 
overcome the resistance to adopting electorialism as part of the IRM’s political self-concept and 
justify this in the biographical narrative in order to avoid causing a split, as it had in each 
instance of the past. As a means to test the support for an increased role for the political self-
concept, the candidates were not authorised to run as Sinn Fein candidates, but they were still 
known members of the IRM. However, these were republican prisoners whose success was 
viewed as support for the IRM’s struggle and their participation in the election acted as a testing 
ground for adopting a more robust political strategy. Support also came in terms of membership; 
as a former IRM member recalls, “a lot of new volunteers came in 1981 who were prepared to do 
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another twenty years [of fighting] just because of the Hunger Strike” (Alonso 116). Adams and 
his comrades used these factors to legitimize and justify their political goals: 
The Hunger Strikes…came at a time when my own political priority was 
to develop Sinn Fein’s political capacity and capability in a planned way, 
which could include a new electoral strategy…Attention was diverted 
from the planned efforts to build an electoral intervention; yet we found 
ourselves achieving, more by accident than by calculation, a series of 
resounding electoral victories…we derived immense new energy, 
commitment and direction from the extraordinary period…(Adams 285). 
 
The Hunger Strikes provided an opportunity for the more politically-minded IRM 
members to create an electoral strategy and to begin directing this momentum toward political 
support for Sinn Fein. Furthermore, the electoral success of the prisoners provided the 
justification that Adams and his colleagues required to adopt an electoral strategy for Sinn 
Fein—thereby changing the self-concept of the movement from a purely militaristic role—and to 
demonstrate how this fit within their biographical narrative. After the Hunger Strikes, the 
political programme of the movement could be legitimately enhanced, and this would be justified 
in the Armalite and Ballot Box Strategy of 1981.  
The idea behind this strategy was to allow Sinn Fein candidates to run in elections while 
at the same time maintaining the armed struggle. In an attempt to justify the shift toward political 
participation through the biographical narrative of the IRM, Danny Morrison
62
 introduced the 
policy at the 1981 ard fheis in the following words: “Who here really believes we can win the 
war through the ballot box? But will anyone object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the 
Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?” (Feeney 303). The biographical narrative of the 
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 Morrison joined Sinn Fein in 1966 and joined the Provisional IRA upon their split from Goulding-MacGiolla in 
1969. He was interned between 1972 and 1975, and upon his release he was appointed editor of Republican News. 
When Adams began gaining influence in the movement, Morrison was one of the like-minded republicans who 
criticised the 1975 ceasefire as well as O’Bradaighs poltical programme. Morrison was given the position of 
Director of Publicity for Sinn Fein in the late 1970’s and maintained an influential role among the Adams faction. 
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IRM had not changed, but the strategy had and with it the importance of the political self-
concept. The IRM leadership would now be able to show that it was possible to have both 
military and electoral success; to enact the roles of both soldier and politician. In this way, fears 
that political concerns would undermine the armed struggle on the part of physical force 
members could be quelled while still pursuing a political strategy. This belief is summed up in an 
interview with an IRM activist: “The step into politics was to win support for armed struggle, it 
wasn’t to solely engage in armed struggle or solely to engage in political struggle as such” 
(Alonso 118). The Armalite and Ballot Box policy initiated the acceptance of politics in the 
IRM’s ranks that would be required to fully engage in the political systems of Ireland and the 
UK, but this project would take a few more years to fully implement. 
1986: Ending Abstention 
The final transition in the IRM’s self-concepts was to accept that politics along with the 
armed struggle could help achieve the goals of the biographical narrative and end the abstention 
policy. And in so doing the political self-concept of the IRM was given legitimacy, thereby re-
establishing resonance with the biographical narrative. The introduction of the Armalite and 
Ballot Box policy in which Sinn Fein candidates would be allowed to contest elections set the 
stage for Sinn Fein’s development in its role as political actor. However, as described in Chapter 
Two, the poor electoral outcomes for Sinn Fein in the Republic of Ireland after the Hunger Strike 
had ended led Adams to conclude that abstention had to be ended in order to regain support in 
the Republic and unite Ireland politically under the Sinn Fein banner. In 1986, after 
approximately five years of preparing both the leadership and the broader membership of the 
IRM, Adams and his colleagues passed a motion to end abstention without causing a split in the 
ranks. Adams was able to avoid a split by aligning the ending of abstention with the IRM’s 
 
 
97 
biographical narrative – that is, he successfully demonstrated how the taking of seats while 
continuing the armed campaign would allow the IRM to fulfill their biographical narrative goal 
as the group that would unite Ireland and oust the British. 
Following the introduction of the Armalite and Ballot Box policy, half of the IRM 
leadership, under O’Bradaigh, were still under the impression that abstention was a necessary 
part of the IRM self-concepts while the other half, under Adams, were working toward 
implementing an even more comprehensive political programme through the ending of 
abstention and attempting to explain how this fit into the IRM’s self-concepts. According to “An 
Introduction to Sinn Fein and Irish Republicanism” on the Sinn Fein official website: 
It was only in the early 1980s that the challenge of Sinn Fein as a serious 
political force and central element in the republican struggle was first 
fully felt. The re-evaluation of strategy and reorganisation which resulted 
from the mass campaign in support of republican prisoners in the H-
Blocks and Armagh before and during the 1981 Hunger Strike (when ten 
prisoners died) set Sinn Fein on its course for the 1980s. 
 
While this is evidence that the latter group was victorious in its political strategy and in 
abandoning the abstention policy, at the time there was still a degree of dissent that had to be 
overcome. In 1982, a Sinn Fein subcommittee was charged with preparing a report on the party’s 
electoral strategy in the Republic of Ireland. O’Bradaigh authored a piece of the report entitled 
“The Effects on the Developing of Such a Strategy of Sinn Fein’s Attitudes to, For Example, 
Armed Struggle, Abstentionism, Social Policy, etc.” wherein his distaste for ending abstention is 
made very apparent: 
Abstention from taking part in enemy parliaments has a definite role in 
maintaining Sinn Fein’s non-conformism with regard to such institutions 
and the system they bolster up and perpetuate. The lesson Sinn Fein 
seeks to drive home is that switching the personnel operating such 
institutions or even replacing them with well-meaning and politically 
educated republican personnel may ameliorate conditions from time to 
time but will not and cannot—because of the nature of these institution—
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bring about the fundamental changes needed to put the Irish people in 
control of their own affairs…It is useless for Sinn Fein to have [Teachta 
Dala]
63
 until they can become abstentionists with political clout…(White 
291). 
 
This quote provides evidence of dissenting voices in the IRM following the decision to 
allow Sinn Fein candidates to run electoral candidates. However, by this time, O’Bradaigh had 
lost much of his own political clout as the leadership of the IRM had for all intents and purposes 
moved to the north. This was especially true following the 1982 ard fheis where Adams and his 
followers were able to pass a motion effectively ending the commitment to Eire Nua—
O’Bradaighs' political policy. O’Bradaigh’s reaction is reflected in the following: 
In 1982, by a two thirds majority, all references to [Eire Nua] were 
deleted from the Constitution of Sinn Fein. As one who has been closely 
and personally identified with that policy for ten years, my position as 
President in the face of a repeated defeat on a major policy has become 
untenable (White 293). 
 
Adams took over as President of Sinn Fein in 1983 and began to propagate the notion of 
ending abstention. He argued the importance of this to furthering the goals of the IRM and 
through his arguments the biographical narrative and the IRM’s self-concepts were being 
realigned. In a “Republican Lecture Series” course of 1984 entitled ‘Economic Resistance’, the 
new leadership advanced the idea that Sinn Fein was just as important an element in the IRM’s 
struggle as the military wing: 
Both the IRA and Sinn Fein play different but convergent roles in the war 
of national liberation. The Irish Republican Army wages an armed 
campaign in… occupied [Northern Ireland] while its elements in the 26 
counties play a supportive role. Sinn Fein maintains the propaganda war 
and is the public and political voice of the Movement…The Movement 
must have a vital mass organisation of the Irish people on its side with 
which to confront reactionary elements in the country who will attempt to 
stop us advancing beyond a British withdrawal situation and on to the 
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 Teachta Dala are members of the Republic of Ireland parliament (Leinster House).  
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socialist republic. Such a mass organisation will not be built purely by 
calling on the Irish people to support the IRA. The exploited masses must 
be made to identify with the national liberation struggle because they see 
a successful conclusion of the war as being essential for their own social 
and economic liberation (Sinn Fein Education Department). 
 
This quote illustrates Adams’ belief that in terms of amassing political support a re-balancing of 
the self-concepts of the IRM was needed. Importantly, it also recognized the need for the 
military strength of the IRA – signalling that both a political and military self-concept were 
needed to achieve their goals. It also alludes to the fact that true popular support would extend 
beyond Northern Ireland, and the IRM thus required a strategy that recognized the fact that the 
people in the Republic of Ireland accepted the governing institutions in the Republic as 
legitimate. To be sure, Adams and those like him would have liked to embark on ending 
abstention as early as 1982. However, this strategy could not be pursued until it was justifiable in 
the biographical narrative and therefore pass without causing a split in the ranks which could 
damage the IRM at a critical time. An interview conducted by Alonso with a former IRM activist 
illuminates the degree to which unity was considered of utmost importance: 
From my own point of view, the changes that happened within 
republicanism didn’t happen soon enough. For instance, the decision to 
participate in the Dublin parliament in 1986, I would have been in favour 
of that happening long before that. But again I’m not, I’m not [sic] sure 
of the usefulness of that exercise, you know, there are a lot of things, a lot 
of developments within republicanism over this [sic] past thirty years I 
would have preferred them to have happened earlier, but I’m conscious 
of the fact that it’s a large organisation and that unity is a cornerstone of 
republican strength and it’s not enough for someone to have a great idea, 
the bulk of the republican movement has to first of all come round to that 
idea for it to take a life (qtd. in Alonso 139).  
 
After many years of promoting the positive aspects of ending abstention, the chance to make that 
change in self-concepts happen without fracturing the IRM came at the 1986 ard fheis. 
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 At Sinn Fein’s annual conference in 1986, the motion to end abstention was passed 
without causing a major split in the ranks of the IRA or of Sinn Fein as it had in 1921, 1926 and 
1969. This decision represented a major transformation in the way the IRM was organized; it 
recognized the importance of participating in electoral politics and created a greater role for Sinn 
Fein that supported and complemented the military effort. Of course, this was only possible due 
to the electoral success in the North, which proved to hardliners that it was possible to have both 
a political and military strategy to accomplish the goals of the IRM. In addition, the leadership 
under Adams was able to align this change in strategy with the self-conceptions of the IRM and 
therefore justify it in the biographical narrative.  
However, there was a certain degree of dissent among the old leadership that is worth 
discussing as it illustrates the degree to which continuity with the past is important in a 
biographical narrative. O’Bradaigh was allowed to present a speech at the 1986 ard fheis before 
the vote was taken in which he denounced the motion to end abstention: 
There’s a total contradiction in this discussion, in fact, the discussion is 
totally out of order if this constitution of Sinn Fein means anything. 
Because it says there that no person who approves or supports candidates 
going into Leinster House, Stormont or Westminster shall be admitted to 
membership or allowed to retain membership, and yet on this floor we 
have plenty of resolutions proposing to go into Leinster House and 
indeed some of them proposing to go into Westminster and Stormont as 
well because they want abstentionism ended altogether. The constitution 
has been, and is being, flouted and has not been made effective 
(O’Bradaigh). 
 
O’Bradaigh began his speech opposing abstention by stating that allowing any IRM 
member to enter the illegitimate parliaments of Leinster House, Stormont or Westminster was 
against Sinn Fein’s constitution, therefore to even discuss abandoning the sacred principle was 
“totally out of order” because it did not fit the IRM’s narrative goal of ousting the British and 
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uniting Ireland. Following his attempt to denounce abstention on legal grounds, O’Bradaigh used 
the symbols, myths and historical narrative of the IRM to delegitimize any organization that 
called itself republican and did not adhere to abstention: 
And it says here…first the allegiance of Irish men and Irish women is 
due to the sovereign Irish republic proclaimed in 1916. It doesn’t say that 
we go into Leinster House or Stormont or Westminster… the sovereignty 
and unity of the republic are inalienable and non-renunciable [sic]. In 
other words, they can’t be given away and are not a matter for 
reconsideration. They are absolute (O’Bradaigh).  
 
In evoking the fundamental nature of the Republic proclaimed in 1916, O’Bradaigh demonstrates 
the extent to which continuity was essential to the IRM’s legitimacy. O’Bradaigh attacked the 
self-concepts of IRM at their core, which are represented by his invocation of the Republic of 
1916. Through this use of history O’Bradaigh wished to convince the ard fheis that ending 
abstention meant that they were giving up their military self-concept and therefore the goals of 
their biographical narrative. For O’Bradaigh and physical force members like him, spending 
energy on electoral politics would weaken the IRM’s struggle and ending abstention meant 
admitting defeat: 
The destabilisation of the state, we are told, will result and the movement 
will be strengthened. Always has it been otherwise, every time has it 
been otherwise, the movement suffered and the state was strengthened. 
Four times since 1922 it happened, all ended in failure and ended 
ultimately in the degradation and shame of collaborating with the British, 
of handing over our political prisoners to them and running counter to 
what they originally set out to do…I put it to you this way, we have not 
been wrong for 65 years, we have not been wrong for all those 70 years 
— we have been right and we should continue to be right (O’Bradaigh).  
 
O’Bradaigh predicted that ending abstention would have the same effect that it had 
always had in the past—it would cause a split in the IRM, and this time the split would occur at a 
critical point in the Troubles. However, through the lens of ontological security the numerous 
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challenges to the IRM’s self-concepts—from the Curfew, the 1972 and 1975 ceasefires and the 
Hunger Strikes—had created dissonance in the IRM’s biographical narrative. The strict 
commitment to the armed struggle and aversion to politics no longer reflected how the IRM saw 
themselves. Hence, Adams and his leadership were able to use the same symbols, myths and 
history to argue their cause, as well as pass their motion on ending abstention. 
 In contrast to O’Bradaighs’ position on abstentionism, Adams and Martin McGuinness64 
presented speeches at the 1986 ard fheis demonstrating how ending abstention was coherent with 
the IRM’s biographical narrative and the next logical step in the evolution of the IRM, and in its 
progress toward securing a British withdrawal and uniting Ireland. In their respective speeches, 
both Adams and McGuinness addressed the possibility of a split. In opposition to O’Bradaigh, 
citing the legal authority of Sinn Fein’s constitution, Adams presented the argument that 
members had no right to leave the IRM at such a critical moment: 
…none of us, regardless of the strength of our views, has the right to 
present the establishment and our opponents with the opportunity to 
project internationally the spectacle of yet another republican ‘split’. 
Indeed, we have a duty to deny them such an opportunity. This struggle 
is bigger than all of us and it demands of us…to unite in the great 
struggle for the re-conquest of our country (Adams).  
 
Here, Adams refers to the fact that IRM members have an obligation to remain with the 
movement in order to further pursue their goals of a united Ireland free of British influence. 
Through this, he maintains that the narrative goals of the IRM have not changed, only the 
balancing of the self-concepts through which those goals will be accomplished. Adams goes on 
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 McGuinness joined the Provisional IRA around the time of their inception and by 1972 he was second-in-
command in Derry. McGuinness claims to have renounced his Provisional IRA membership in 1974, at which time 
he did become increasingly active and influential in Sinn Fein. By 1986, McGuinness was Vice-president of Sinn 
Fein. Alongside Adams, McGuinness was one of the leaders of the charge to end abstention in 1986. 
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to argue against O’Braidgh’s notion that to end abstention is to no longer be identified as 
republican: 
Some of you may feel that a republican organisation making such a 
change can no longer call itself ‘republican’. If there are delegates here 
who feel like this I would remind you that another republican 
organisation has already done what you fear we are going to do 
tomorrow. I would remind you that the Army Authority of Oglaigh na 
hEirean, the rank and file volunteers…has remained united in its 
determination to pursue the armed struggle and is united in its confidence 
in us and in our ability to pursue the political struggle. There was no 
walk-out from the IRA by IRA Volunteers… And the logic which would 
dictate withdrawal of support from Sinn Fein if decisions go against you 
means that you have already decided to withdraw solidarity and support 
from the IRA and the armed struggle. It means that you have decided to 
stop supporting captured republicans incarcerated in British or Free State 
prisons or in prisons in Europe and the USA…To leave Sinn Fein is to 
leave the struggle (Adams). 
 
This excerpt reiterates the historical fact that the IRA and Sinn Fein are two inextricably linked 
elements of the IRM’s self-concepts; to abandon one element is to abandon the other. Making 
this point also demonstrated to the ard fheis that the leadership was not interested in abandoning 
the armed struggle in favour of politics—rather, they saw the two as complementary.  
McGuinness echoed this point in his speech: 
the ranks of the IRA contain a minority of volunteers who, while opposed 
to the removal of abstentionism from Leinster House, have committed 
themselves to stand shoulder to shoulder in unity with their comrades. 
They will not split, they will not walk away from the armed struggle. 
They are the real revolutionaries. If you allow yourself to be led out of 
this hall today, the only place you’re going - is home. You will be 
walking away from the struggle. Don’t go my friends. We will lead you 
to the republic (McGuinness). 
  
In this part of his speech, McGuinness shares the sentiment that Sinn Fein and the IRA are 
inextricably linked. Additionally, as the passage demonstrates, both Adams and McGuinness put 
forward the argument that ending abstention does not mean that the IRM has relinquished their 
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commitments. Rather, the leadership sees abandoning the abstention policy as the logical step 
forward: 
We all must share the daunting and massive task of interpreting and 
applying republicanism to changing and changed political conditions. 
Our failure to do this is one of the tragic failures of the past…no 
generation of republicans could or should ever merely absorb the 
teachings of previous generations. Those who were successful in the past 
in advancing the republican cause, even by one inch, updated and 
modernised the teaching and experiences of their predecessors. This is 
what Lalor did, what Pearse did, what Connolly did - and it is what we 
have to do also (Adams).  
 
According to Adams’ speech, abstention was hindering the IRM from achieving their 
goals of British withdrawal and uniting Ireland. Adams states that dogmatism and inflexibility 
are responsible for the failures of the past. He emphasized continuity by invoking the names of 
prominent IRM members from the past who adapted the actions of the IRM to their particular 
political, social and economic conditions. Through the use of these symbols and myths, Adams 
combats O’Bradaighs’ assertion that ending abstention is renouncing republicanism. In order to 
further make this point, both Adams and McGuinness make reference to the fact that the goal of 
British withdrawal and Irish unification have not changed; nor has the commitment to the armed 
struggle. Adams stated: 
I share their abhorrence of neo-colonialism and their detestation of those 
who govern this part of Ireland in the interests of imperialism. My family 
were opposed to the Treaty and the Partition Act. Like many Northern 
republicans, they suffered for their beliefs at that time, not only in the 6 
Counties but in later years in the glasshouse of the Curragh 
Concentration Camp and other Free State prisons…we are committed to 
the re-conquest of Ireland by the Irish people. This means the expulsion 
of imperialism in all its forms, political, economic, military, social and 
cultural. It means the establishment of a real Irish republic and the 
organisation of the economy so that all its resources are under Irish 
control and organised to bring maximum benefit to the people in a 32-
County state in which Irish culture and national identity is [sic] strong 
and confident (Adams).  
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This quotation demonstrates Adams’ use of historical ties to the IRM’s cause to legitimize his 
position. Furthermore, he reiterates the commitment to Sinn Fein, the IRA and the thirty-two 
country Republic they had been fighting for for nearly twenty years. What is new is the 
suggestion that participating in electoral politics is the next step in the progress they have already 
made.  
McGuinness also makes reference to the fact that nothing has changed within the IRM 
other than embracing a more robust political strategy: 
Sadly the inference that the removal of abstentionism would lead to the 
demise of military opposition to British Rule has indeed called into 
question the commitment of the IRA to pursue the struggle to a 
successful conclusion. I reject any such suggestion and I reject the notion 
that entering Leinster House would mean an end to Sinn Fein’s 
unapologetic support for the right of Irish people to oppose in arms the 
British forces of occupation. That, my friends, is a principle which a 
minority in this hall might doubt but which I believe all our opponents 
clearly understand. Our position is clear and it will never, never, never 
change. The war against British rule must continue until freedom is 
achieved (McGuinness).  
 
 Both Adams and McGuinness used their speeches at the 1986 ard fheis to rebalance the 
self-concepts of the IRM to include a greater role for electoral politics and therefore the political 
self-concept. They used the symbols, myths and narratives of historical republicanism to 
legitimize their position in the IRM. Importantly, they demonstrated that the biographical 
narrative of the IRM had not changed, but they had to re-balance their self-concepts to include a 
greater role for the political self-concept in order to achieve those objectives. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis introduced the decision to end abstention, a core policy of the IRM, and 
subsequently explained this decision via ontological security and argued that such a change in 
policy direction was required to reconcile the growing dissonance between the IRM’s 
biographical narrative and its self-concepts. Since the Proclamation of the Republic was read 
during the 1916 Easter Rising, the IRM had committed itself to forcing the withdrawal of the 
British from all of Ireland and, after partition, the unification of Northern Ireland with the 
Republic of Ireland. Two cornerstones of these efforts were abstention and armed struggle – 
wherein the use of arms was viewed as the primary means for achieving the IRM’s stated goals 
and the abstention policy limited any political strategies through the practice of not taking 
elected seats in what were considered ‘foreign’ and illegitimate parliaments. Efforts to end the 
abstention policy were pursued at various points throughout the IRM’s history; however, this 
caused major splits in the movements’ ranks in 1921, 1926 and 1969. On one side were the IRM 
members who held up the traditions of the IRM as they has been established during the 1916 
Easter Rising, especially in regard to the use of physical force and abstaining from participation 
in formal political institutions. On the other side were the members who pushed to end abstention 
insofar as they believed political participation could achieve their goals to a greater degree than 
the use of arms. It was not until 1986 that the IRM successfully ended the abstention policy 
while maintaining the confidence of IRM members and thereby avoid any split in or between 
Sinn Fein and the IRA. This was achieved during the seventeenth year of the Troubles – the 
violent conflict that engrossed Northern Ireland for most of the 1970’s and 1980’s. This thesis 
sought to answer both why the IRM decided to end abstention at this time as well as how they 
were able to achieve such an important institutional change. This thesis argued that the timing in 
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which this decision took place is integral to understanding how and why the decision was made. 
Over the course of the Troubles the IRM faced a number of critical events that caused dissonance 
between their self-concepts and biographical narrative. The result of numerous challenges to the 
IRM’s ontological security was the realignment of their self-concepts and biographical narrative 
which was achieved through ending abstention. 
 Chapter two utilized four events, the Lower Falls Curfew, the 1972 and 1975 ceasefires 
and the 1981 Hunger Strikes, to illustrate how the IRM transitioned from a movement dominated 
by their commitment to armed conflict to one that embraced ending abstention and participating 
in politics to achieve their aims. The first event, the Lower Falls Curfew, is important because it 
legitimized the IRM in the eyes of the community that they protected and consequently, in the 
belief that the armed struggle would be the primary means to achieve their goals. Following the 
Curfew, self-concepts and biographical narrative resonated and the IRM engaged in a military 
conflict with the British as well as unionist paramilitary forces. The 1972 and 1975 ceasefires 
were important because, by bringing the British to the negotiating table, the IRM’s claims that 
the armed struggle was the way to securing Irish unification were substantiated. However, the 
inability to make any progress in both instances led some members to recognize a need for a 
change in strategy. Following the 1972 and 1975 ceasefire, the dissonance between self-concepts 
and biographical narrative became apparent and it was at this time that Adams began to 
recognize and propagate the need for embracing politics in the IRM. The final event, the Hunger 
Strikes, is important because the electoral success of IRM members proved to the majority of the 
IRM that a political program could not only exist alongside the armed struggle, but act as the 
gateway to moving from military conflict to British withdrawal and eventual reunification. As a 
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result of this recognition, the abstention policy could and would be abandoned in 1986, and 
resonance between self-concepts and biographical narrative was re-established. 
 In order to make sense of the transition laid out in Chapter two, an ontological security 
model is used. Ontological security is understood as “the need to experience oneself as a whole, 
continuous person in time…in order to realize a sense of agency” (Mitzen, 342) and it is useful 
for understanding the otherwise “irrational” behaviour of the IRM. Chapter Three argues that the 
IRM was acting to protect its identity needs. It utilizes an ontological security perspective to 
describe how the behaviour and interests of the IRM from the beginning of the Troubles to the 
ending of abstention were motivated by the need to maintain a consistent self-identity. This is 
important to this thesis because the IRM sought routines that maintained resonance between their 
military and political self-concepts and the biographical narrative which stated that they were the 
harbingers of British withdrawal and Irish unification. At the outset of the Troubles, the military 
self-concept embodied by the armed struggle resonated with that narrative to a much greater 
extent than the political self-concept. Through the events of the Troubles it became increasingly 
evident that the IRM’s military self-concept alone no longer reflected and no longer achieved the 
stated goals of the biographical narrative. This is important to this thesis because the dissonance 
that this created meant that the IRM was ontologically insecure and would have been unable to 
exercise agency had they not re-established that alignment. More specifically, when the IRM’s 
military self-concept alone no longer reflected how they saw themselves in terms of their 
biographical narrative, they altered their behaviour by ending their commitment to the abstention 
policy and enlarging the role of their political self-concept. 
By applying the ontological security model to the four identified events between 1970 
and 1986, Chapter four details the fluctuations in resonance and dissonance between the IRM’s 
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two self-concepts and their biographical narrative which eventually led to the ending of 
abstention. At the time of the Lower Falls Curfew the IRM was ontologically secure as there was 
resonance between self-concepts and biographical narrative. The primacy of the military self-
concept resonated with the narrative goal of ousting the British and unifying Ireland because the 
IRM successfully used military means alone to defend the community. Resonance between self-
concepts and biographical narrative was also present at the outset of the 1972 and 1975 
ceasefires – the IRM had twice demonstrated that they could utilize the armed struggle alone to 
bring the British to the negotiating table. Following the ceasefires the IRM began to experience 
ontological insecurity as a result of dissonance between their self-concepts and biographical 
narrative. That is, the lack of progress made in the two ceasefire negotiations made it evident that 
the military self-concept alone could not achieve the goals stated in the biographical narrative. 
Some IRM members began to understand that the military self-concept was useful for bringing 
the British to negotiate but, in order to make those negotiations successful, the IRM would have 
to enlarge their political self-concept.  
The 1981 Hunger Strikes offered the first opportunity to re-establish resonance between 
the self-concepts and biographical narrative of the IRM through the enlargement of the political 
self-concept and the eventual ending of abstention. When Adams ran IRM prisoners in elections 
on an abstentionist ticket he maintained continuity and routines by demonstrating a commitment 
to abstention while at the same time creating a larger role for the political self-concept. The 
electoral success of the IRM prisoners demonstrated that the military self-concept and political 
self-concept could coexist to achieve the goals of their biographical narrative. Following the 
success of the Armalite and Ballot Box strategy wherein Adams successfully demonstrated that 
formal participation in politics could help achieve the goals of a continuing armed struggle, the 
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abstention policy was ended in 1986. By ending the abstention policy and justifying this 
institutional change in their biographical narrative, resonance between the IRM’s self-concepts 
and the biographical narrative was re-established and ontological security restored.  
This thesis demonstrated that the IRM abandoned the abstention policy because, by the 
end of the Troubles, abstention no longer resonated with the self-concepts and biographical 
narrative of the movement. Throughout the Troubles, the IRM faced numerous challenges to 
their self-concepts that resulted in dissonance with their biographical narrative. In order for the 
IRM to feel agentic, a change in the form of ending abstention was needed. Importantly, this 
shift in the IRM’s self-concepts placed them in a legitimate position to negotiate with the British 
and usher in a relative era of peace; that is, the end of abstention and entrance into existing 
political institutions enabled the movement to participate and, make actual progress in, peace 
negotiations. This formal political participation eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998, which is viewed as the cornerstone to peace in Northern Ireland today. The success of the 
agreement hinges on the IRM’s participation in existing political institutions as well as their 
ability to prevent the movement’s inclination to use armed force to achieve their goals. While the 
goal of the IRM has never changed – the leadership is pushing for the unification of Ireland to 
this day – the strategy for achieving those goals, including the ending of abstention and the 
disarmament of the IRM, offers far more stability and peace than what was experienced during 
the violent era of the Troubles. It is worth exploring to what extent conflicts such as this can be 
resolved by understanding the biographical narrative of a group, in terms of their stated goals, 
and how this resonates with their routines and creates ontological security.  
The argument presented in this thesis has two interesting insights to be considered more 
generally: the possible limitation on the rational actor model and consequently the possibly 
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utility of applying the ontological security model to conflict. There are two important 
implications of these conclusions: first, the rational actor model cannot be used to understand the 
behaviour of the IRM; and second, ontological security offers an alternative understanding of the 
IRM’s behaviour and extends insight into conflict resolution. To the first point, the history of the 
IRM and their decision to end abstention is better understood through ontological security than 
through the lens of traditional security models such as liberalism and realism. These schools of 
thought assume that the behaviour of a rational actor is based on calculations of physical security 
and economic prosperity. As has been shown, since its inception during the 1916 Eater Rising, 
the IRM has not been motivated by either their physical security or economic prosperity. 
Members of the IRM pledged their lives to achieving the goals of ousting the British from 
Ireland and unifying the Republic of Ireland with Northern Ireland, and they did so at a time 
when the armed struggle was viewed as the primary means for achieving those goals. The IRM 
and its members saw themselves as a legitimate army fighting a war with the British and, as 
such, were very aware that their physical security was at risk. It can therefore be concluded that 
reasons of physical security and economic prosperity did not influence the behaviour of the IRM 
and its members. This thesis sought to demonstrate that the behaviour of the IRM was motivated 
by an alternative consideration – that of their identity.  
Ontological security suggests that an actor’s behaviour is motivated by the need to 
maintain a consistent self-identity over time and this explanation offers different insight into the 
actions of the IRM than that of traditional security models. In the case of the IRM, the 
commitments to abstention and the armed struggle were an integral aspect of the movement’s 
routines since the 1916 Easter Rising through to the Troubles that began in 1969. Although these 
commitments put their physical security at risk insofar as they were a relatively small group 
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fighting a far better-equipped British Army that enjoyed the backing of the entire British political 
apparatus, they pursued these actions because they had become part of the routinized social 
relationships that are integral to self-identity. As Mitzen explains, self-identity is formed and 
sustained in social relationships and actors achieve consistency as well as agency by routinizing 
their social relationships. For the IRM, the conflict with the British was a part of their routines 
insofar as this social relationship came to sustain their self-identity needs and, importantly, this 
conflict would be difficult to resolve without the challenges the IRM faced during those four 
moments of the Troubles. 
 
 
113 
Glossary of Terms 
 
abstention: the practice of contesting elections and not taking elected seats. For Republicans, this 
meant not abstaining from taking seats in Westminster (UK), Leinster House (Dublin) and 
Stormont (Northern Ireland). This is one of two principles that are central to republicanism (the 
other is armed struggle/physical force). 
 
Act of the Union: passed in 1800 after the rebellion of the United Irishmen (1798) and mandated 
that the Irish electorate would send their representatives to Westminster rather than Dublin. 
 
Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921: effectively ended the War of Independence and established the Irish 
Free State by providing self-governing authority to the twenty-six counties. It also provided the 
option for Northern Ireland to opt out of the Free State and remain with the UK, which they 
exercised. The Treaty caused splits within and between Sinn Fein and the IRA. 
 
ard fheis: Sinn Fein’s annual part conference. 
 
armed struggle/physical force: the tradition of using violent/military means to oust the 
English/British from Ireland, in recent history, carried out by the IRA and the PIRA. This is one 
of two principles that are central to republicanism (the other is abstention). 
 
cumainn: a Sinn Fein Association. 
 
Cumann na mBan: an all-women paramilitary formed in 1914 as an auxiliary of the Irish 
Volunteers and who participated in the 1916 Easter Uprising.  
 
Dail Eireann: after the 1918 general election wherein Sinn Fein won 73 seats out of 105 and 
abstained from taking their seats in Westminter, the representatives gathered in the Mansion 
House in Dublin and formed this parliament. The Dail was never officially recognized by the 
British. 
 
Fianna Fail: the party started by Eeamon de Valera in 1926 following the split in Sinn Fein over 
the issue of ending abstention. 
 
Free State forces: formed by the Free State government to combat de Valera’s anti-Treaty IRA 
‘Irregulars’ during the Civil War. Only operated in the Irish Free State. 
 
Government of Ireland Act: passed in 1920, the Act was intended to grant Home Rule to Ireland 
and was to be administered through one parliament in Belfast (Stormont) and another in Dublin 
(Leinster House). Both the North and South were to remain a part of the United Kingdom. 
However, Home Rule never took place in southern Ireland as a result of the War of 
Independence, while Northern Ireland was established with the opening of Stormont (Belfast 
parliament) in 1921. Republicans and nationalists viewed the two parliaments as an unofficial 
partition of Ireland and this undermined the Republic that was established in 1916. 
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Irish Citizen Army: a group consisting of trained trade union members for the purpose of 
protecting workers from police at demonstrations that participated in the 1916 Easter Uprising. 
 
Irish Free State: refers to the twenty-six counties in the south of historical Ireland that became 
self-governing as a result of the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The remaining six counties 
became Northern Ireland and remained part of the UK. In 1949, the Free State became the 
Republic of Ireland. 
 
Irish Republican Army: a paramilitary organization formed after the 1916 Easter Uprising and 
descended from the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Irish Volunteers and other participants in 
the Uprising. The military half of what makes up the larger republican movement, the IRA’s goal 
was to oust the British from Ireland and secure a united Ireland through military means. 
 
Irish Republican Brotherhood: the predecessor of the IRA that ceased to exist after 1924. A 
fraternal organization dedicated to Irish independence that helped to organize, and participated 
in, the Easter Uprising. 
 
Irish Volunteers: an organization of Irish nationalists formed in 1913 that helped organize the 
Easter Uprising with the IRB and participated in the event.  
 
Leinster House: the national parliament of the Republic of Ireland located in Dublin. 
 
loyalist: individuals that consider themselves attached to the British monarchy and who support 
the preservation of Northern Ireland and oppose a united Ireland.  
 
nationalist: refers to someone who believes in the unification of Northern Ireland with the 
Republic of Ireland.  
 
Northern Ireland: refers to the six counties in the north of historical Ireland that were partitioned 
from the rest of Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and remained part of the UK. 
The remaining twenty-six counties became the Irish Free State. 
 
oath of allegiance: the oath republican leaders would have to swear to King George as a required 
by the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921. 
 
Orangemen: Protestants that belong to the Orange Order who is responsible for organizing the 
Orange parades that celebrate Protestant/English military victories. 
 
Proclamation of the Republic: considered the foundational document for the independent Irish 
state, this was the Proclamation that was read when the rebels took the General Post Office 
during the 19161 Easter Uprising. The document declared the right of the Irish people to 
ownership and governance over Ireland, as opposed to the long usurpation of that right by a 
foreign people and government and established the Republic that republicans claim allegiance to. 
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Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA; with Sinn Fein: Provisional): the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army was a paramilitary organization formed in 1969 when the 
Irish Republican Army split over the issue of ending abstention. With Provisional Sinn Fein, they 
formed the Provisional republican movement, which was the true embodiment of republicanism, 
and their objective was to defend Catholics and nationalists in Northern Ireland, oust the British 
from Northern Ireland and unify Ireland. 
 
Provisional Sinn Fein (with IRA: Provisional): the Provisional Sinn Fein was the political 
organisation formed in 1970 when Sinn Fein split over the issue of ending abstention. With the 
Provisional IRA, they formed the Provisional republican movement, which was the true 
embodiment of republicanism, and their objective was to support the Provisional IRA in the 
armed struggle. Throughout the Troubles, as the movement politicised, Sinn Fein’s role 
increased.  
 
The Republic (of 1916): refers to the Republic established by the Proclamation read during the 
1916 Easter Uprising. Although it was never officially recognized as such, it is this Republic that 
republicans claim allegiance to.  
 
Republic of Ireland: in 1949, the Republic of Ireland was established amongst the twenty-six 
counties of the south. While the constitution was adopted in 1937, it was not until 1949 that the 
remaining duties of the king were removed and the Republic of Ireland Act was passed. 
 
Second Dail: the second parliament convened by abstentionist Sinn Fein elected representatives. 
Convened in 1921 this parliament was also not recognized by the British. 
 
Sinn Fein: formed in 1904-5 by Arthur Griffith who advanced a policy of: abstaining from 
sending Irish MPs to Westminster; peaceful resistance and opposition to physical force; a dual 
monarchy wherein Ireland and Britain would have the same monarch, but with two parliaments 
separate and independent from each other; and self-sufficiency through the use of Irish 
approaches to Irish problems. The leadership of the Easter Uprising assumed control of the Sinn 
Fein banner following the Rising and abandoned the peaceful resistance and dual monarchy 
principles in favour of an armed campaign and political independence in the form of a Republic. 
However, because it resonated with the goals of the Proclamation, the abstentionist policy was 
maintained. Sinn Fein evolved to become the political wing of the larger republican movement.  
 
Special Category Status: all those imprisoned as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland 
would be granted political status. Granted by Whitelaw in 1972 and removed in 1976 as a result 
of the criminalisation policy. This resulted in the Hunger Strikes of 1981 that led to the death of 
ten men and eventually the re-granting of SCS. 
 
Stormont: the parliament in Northern Ireland that was set up under the Government of Ireland 
Act 1920 and which remained tied the United Kingdom until its cessation in 1972. 
 
unionist: The Act of the Union 1800 stated that the Irish electorate would cease to send its 
representatives to Dublin and instead return them to Westminster. Henceforth, those 
Protestants/loyalists who supported the union with Britain earned the term ‘unionists’.  
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